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From ‘OPEN SEASON’ to ‘ROYAL GAME’: The Strategic Repositioning of Commercial Farmers across the Independence Transition in Zimbabwe

1972-1985

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This paper explores the strategic repositioning of commercial farmers across the Independence transition, from a close proximity to the Rhodesian Front to an alliance with the Mugabe regime. It argues, contrary to most analyses, that commercial farmers were instrumental in leading white Rhodesia towards negotiations, compromise and settlement, and that this positioned them well to retain their privileged access to land and the decision making process after Independence. Whilst recognising that ZANU PF compromised significantly, it illustrates that incomplete reconciliation and ongoing distortions in access to resources kept the racial aspects of the new alliance unsteady.

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“I repeat, I do not believe in majority rule - not in a thousand years!”
- Ian Smith, March 1976. ²

“It is perhaps the end of the beginning”
- Ian Smith, September 1976. ³

“In Zimbabwe, none of the white exploiters will be allowed to keep a single acre of their land!”
- Robert Mugabe, October 1976. ⁴

“The wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten”
- Robert Mugabe, March 1980. ⁵

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² Mugabe, Smith and the Union Jack, Interview with David Dimbleby, BBC 2 Documentary, April 2000.
³ Mugabe, Smith and the Union Jack, Interview with David Dimbleby, BBC 2 Documentary, April 2000.
⁴ Caute (1983: 78). This was Mugabe’s public position at the Geneva conference. Also in Zeilig (2002).
⁵ Extract from Mugabe’s speech of reconciliation (De Waal, 1990: Back cover).
1 INTRODUCTION

Robin Palmer (1990) pondered the irony of how Rhodesia’s white farmers transformed from the material and symbolic targets of guerrilla fighters during the bush war, into members of a ‘protected species’ within the six months around Independence in 1980. This paper, which is drawn from the second chapter of my doctoral thesis, explores this transition, illustrating that it was more gradual and complex, but remarkable nevertheless (Selby, 2006).^6^ The first chapter of the thesis traced the skewed consolidation of resources by a settler state primarily shaped and controlled by white farming interests, whose exclusion and exploitation of the black majority eventually led to civil war. It also set out fundamental historical divisions among farmers including differences in farm size, crop type, region, ideology, background and culture, arguing that these divisions always shaped their collective power, unity and policies. The objective of this paper is to explore how white farmers, across their divisions, reacted to the pressures of war and managed to retain access to land across the Independence transition.

Important questions relating to commercial farmers and their positions within white society during this transition have not been satisfactorily answered. The impacts of the war on farmers, and their diverse reactions are generally absent in the literature, as is their changing relationship with the Rhodesian state during this period. Because of the central role of prominent farmers in the Rhodesian Front, white farmers were often perceived to have been the first line of defence and the last group to surrender during the war. Most outsiders’ perceptions of white Rhodesia were of a minority, uniformly opposing the concept of majority rule in order to preserve a privileged lifestyle, at the expense of the black population. This impression is supported by the Rhodesian Front’s (RF) overwhelming electoral victories and representation of itself as the legitimate voice of white Rhodesia. Furthermore, the tendency for whites and farmers to homogenise themselves as part of a defensive strategy within the siege mentality of a ‘Rhodesian identity’ bolstered external perceptions of unity.

However, these views often rest on the flawed assumption that farmers continued to constitute the core of the Rhodesian Front. To look beyond the illusion of a homogenous white island, at internal divisions, has been difficult from many perspectives and undesirable from some, particularly those of nationalists and the nationalist literature.\(^7\) This paper will illustrate that white politics during the transition were more complex than the contemporary discourse suggests, and that farmers were increasingly proactive in the political processes of negotiation and transition. This has important implications for the subsequent land debate and questions of farmer resistance during ensuing periods of reform, pressure and change in Zimbabwe.

There is a rich literature on the war and transition period but little focus on white farmers.\(^8\) Godwin and Hancock’s (1993) analysis of white politics explored the impact of war and political change on the white community. Although they delve beyond the cohesive façade of white Rhodesian hegemony by tracing changes within a deluded but divided white community, the varied experiences and complexities of farming communities are overlooked. Grundy and Miller’s (1979) biographical account of commercial farmers during the liberation struggle, is an interesting but sympathetic impression that often exaggerates the unity of the farming community. Caute’s (1983: 137) critical perspective on white Rhodesia stereotypes white farmers for different reasons.\(^9\) Only by analysing the politics of white farmers across the transition and exploring their successful repositioning with different interest groups, does the nature of their strategic alliance with the post-independence state becomes clearer.

1.2 THE IMPACTS OF THE WAR

The guerrilla attack at Altena farm in Centenary, on 21 December 1972, was a significant moment in Rhodesian history signalling a shift in guerrilla tactics and the nature of the war. Military experiences of the late 1960s had been limited to a few skirmishes, fought in conventional mode, which Rhodesian forces easily contained. Relatively successful ‘sanctions-busting’, import substitution and economic growth sustained confidence throughout white Rhodesia, but this changed under the pressures of economic downturn and the escalation of the war. By assessing the material, economic and social impacts of the war we begin to understand the complex role that farmers played in shaping the transition.

\(^7\) For example, see Mandaza (1986).
\(^8\) For example, see Kriger (1988 and 1992), Ranger (1985) and Lan (1985). Hodder Williams’ (1983) fascinating insight into the Marandellas farming community ends at UDI, whilst Leys’ (1959) analysis of white politics ends even earlier. Likewise, Arrighi’s (1981) class analysis of white settler society is not brought through the war.
\(^9\) Meredith (1980), Boynton (1994) and Hills (1978 and 1981) lack any analysis or insight into the farming sector.
1.2.1 Increasing Farmer Casualties

White farmers were at the forefront of the bush war and attacks on other white civilians were extremely rare before 1976. The increasing number of farmer deaths and their share of civilian casualties were important in shifting farmers’ attitudes towards compromise and settlement. No white farmers were killed by guerrillas between 1967 and 1972. Seven farmers died in 1973 and six in 1974. Twenty-five farmers were killed in 1975 and thirty-one in 1976. In 1977 there were fifty-five deaths within white farming families and this increased to one hundred and sixteen the following year. During the settlement talks in 1979 there were still eighty farming related deaths, and by this stage most farming families had lost close friends or relatives (Caute, 1983: 43; Grundy and Miller 1979: Roll of Honour; Godwin and Hancock, 1993).

As the war wore on, the number and nature of serious injuries escalated, as did the impact on prominent farmers. Pat Bashford, a wealthy tobacco farmer from Karoi and leader of the opposition Centre Party (CP), who had warned the white community about the consequences of war in 1972, lost his son David on call-up in 1976. Max Rosenfels, longstanding Matabeleland branch chairman of the RNFU, was called out of a council meeting to be told that his son Ian, aged 26, had been shot and killed on their ranch.\textsuperscript{10} The brutal impacts of the war quickly found their way into the highest echelons of the farming community. Approximately 300 farmers or members of their immediate families were killed between 1972 and 1980, which amounted to more than half of white civilian deaths (Grundy and Miller, 1979: Roll of Honour). As in the First Chimurenga, settler farmers bore the brunt of the cost within white society, which had important ramifications for their identity and for their claims of legitimacy over land rights.

1.2.3 The Varying Impacts of War among Farmers

Experiences of the war varied considerably between different farming districts. Centenary, Mt Darwin and Shamva initially suffered the highest numbers of attacks and casualties in 1973 and 1974. The remote, mountainous topography and proximity to the border with Mozambique rendered them more vulnerable to guerrilla incursions and withdrawals, and attacks spread across the northern districts into Guruve, Karoi and Tengwe. By 1980 these outlying northern districts had lost more than 80 members (roughly ten percent) of their farming communities (Grundy and

\textsuperscript{10} Minutes of the RNFU Council Meeting, 29 March 1978.
Miller, 1979: Roll of Honour). Doma farming district was an important exception in the north. Although geographically vulnerable in its remoteness and proximity to the Zambezi escarpment it emerged relatively intact. John Brown claims that this was due to the effectiveness of their local defence strategies based on farmer-organised Area Co-ordinating Committees (ACC):

On reflection we were ‘revved’ (attacked) far less than we should have been…only two farmers were killed on their land in Doma during the war and out of nearly 100 farms in the area I believe that only two were abandoned by the end of it.\textsuperscript{11}

Doma was also a buffer-zone between ZIPRA and ZANLA operational areas which was undoubtedly a contributing factor. By avoiding it the two groups reduced the likelihood of encounters and clashes between them.

\textbf{Figure 1.1 \quad Farming Districts Most Heavily Affected During the War}

In 1976, following the collapse of Portuguese rule in Mozambique, the focus of the war shifted to the eastern districts, which were even more mountainous and proximate to the border. The impact of the war was severe on farmers in Chipinga, Melsetter and Gazaland. Approximately fifty members of their farming families were killed in two years, between 1976 and 1978. More than twenty percent of the pupils at the primary school for whites had lost at least one parent by 1978 and only a few farms were still operating by that stage (Caute, 1983: 225 and 271). Twenty-four homesteads had been destroyed in Melsetter and of 105 functional farms in 1976,

\textsuperscript{11} Interview with John Brown, Mt Hampden, January 2004.
only eight were still running by the end of 1978. Mayo district, which had nineteen white families in 1976 had been abandoned by 1980, and there were eighty vacant farms in the Rusape-Headlands area (Caute: 260). Conversely, Salisbury South and Darwendale remained relatively secure due to their open topography and long distances from communal areas or hostile borders. There were less than ten farming victims from areas within a fifty-mile radius of the capital.

Farmers were less likely to abandon properties in vulnerable but affluent tobacco-growing areas, like Centenary and Mtoko, despite being prone to guerrilla attacks. Joint Operations Command (JOC) worked closely with the RNFU, and the RTA to ensure that tobacco growing areas, in particular, were protected, using both security and financial incentives. Volunteers from urban areas, known as ‘bright lights’ would live with remote and vulnerable homesteads, to provide moral and military support. The AFC (Land Bank) introduced a policy of providing young entrant farmers with favourable loans on abandoned farms, often bordering TTLs. These became known as ‘buffer farms’: by maintaining the ‘front line’ they shielded established farmers in the midst of the farming areas - occasionally an issue of contention, animosity and division within white farming communities.\(^\text{12}\)

Aside from extra government support including ‘agric-alert’ systems and standard security devices, wealthier farmers from tobacco areas were able to afford extra militia and security. Farming enterprises in the Eastern Highlands were generally less affluent, which reduced incentives for farmers to remain in high-risk areas. As more farmers deserted properties so guerrilla forces had more freedom for movement in these expanding ‘liberated’ zones, and the local support and morale of remaining farmers was undermined further. So whilst Centenary maintained a critical mass of farmers, and most farms were still occupied by the end of the war, large areas of the Eastern Districts were deserted by 1980.

According to Parade magazine, only seven white farmers were killed on their land in Matabeleland during the war.\(^\text{13}\) This was a result of a conscious ZIPRA strategy to avoid white farmsteads, and limit security force activity, enabling easier infiltration and withdrawal.\(^\text{14}\) Grundy and Miller (1979: Roll of Honour) show that Matabeleland lost more than forty members

\(^{12}\) Discussion with Cal Martin, Harare, February 2003.
\(^{13}\) This is also cited in Alexander (1993).
\(^{14}\) Ed Cumming and Denis Streak both commented on the relatively ‘quiet’ experience of ranchers in Matabeleland during the war, because of the ZAPU strategy, which is also supported by Alexander (1991) and Caute (1983).
of its white farming community – it seems that many Matabeleland farmer casualties occurred on
the battlefield and in civilian ambushes, rather than on their own farms.

Experiences of the war also differed between town and country. Grundy and Miller (1979: Chapter 15) mention a distinct rural-urban divide on many of the war issues. Godwin and Hancock (1993: 3 and 115) also draw attention to this:

Salisbury frequently provoked acerbic comment from the rural communities… (and) incidents which happened within an hour’s drive of Harare might have been happening a thousand miles away for all that they affected city dwellers…whilst areas furthest from the fighting were the most vulnerable to rumour and susceptible to uncertainty.

Some farming communities were consistently at the ‘sharp end’ whilst urban areas remained relatively unaffected during the early years. After Independence, Mugabe noted the difference between rural and urban war experiences and paid tribute to the resolve of the rural communities, both white and black:

Let us not forget that it was in the rural areas that the people on both sides in the struggle faced the full onslaught and horrors of war. For neither group was there the comfort of city life; the consolation and certainty of the necessity of life. Indeed the certainty of life itself was often remote (Modern Farming Publications, 1982: Foreword).

Individual farmer’s experiences differed considerably too, as did their levels of tolerance. Accordingly, the pace and nature of farmer defiance, resistance and capitulation varied. The war affected and exposed different personal attitudes, which often influenced the behaviour of individuals in unpredictable ways for long afterwards. Chris Kearns, from Mtoko, lost three brothers (Caute, 1983: 41). His enduring racial intolerance and bitterness earned him a controversial reputation with local communities and government officials. Max Rosenfels, from Figtree, lost four close relatives, three of them in the last year of the war, but adopted a more conciliatory perspective. He channelled his energy into public service and even became a ZANU PF Member of Parliament after the Unity Accord in 1987.

John Strong’s farm bordered the Guruve TTL and was highly exposed, but remained unattacked throughout the war. He thinks that sympathetic local communities diverted guerrilla activity

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15 This was substantiated in an interview with James Lowry, Wiltshire, February 2002.
because of his progressive employment style and neighbourliness.16 Farmers with poor race relations or bad management reputations were often identified by farm workers and local communities, and then specifically targeted by the guerrillas.17 Godwin and Hancock (1993) and Caute (1983) both explain the attacks on Archie Dalgleish and Marc De Borgrave in Centenary as consequences of racist attitudes and insensitive employment styles. Phimister (1988: 10) agrees: “white farmers who were particularly obnoxious neighbours or bad employers were identified by peasants and labourers as specific targets for guerrilla vengeance”. Palmer (1977: 246) cites evidence that guerrillas identified unpopular farmers through local villagers and selected their targets accordingly.

However, if this was a formal strategy it was inconsistent. Tim Peech, a ‘liberal’ farmer from Macheke, was widely known for his progressive views. He had managed to negotiate a peaceful stand-off with the local ZANLA commander in the Mrewa area, but was brutally murdered whilst on a ‘peace’ initiative in 1978 (Caute, 1983: 260). The progressive nature of other farmers also seemed to count for little with time. Towards the end of the war a number of ‘liberal’ farmers in the Penalonga area, who had been members of the Capricorn Society and the Centre Party, were attacked by ZANLA troops (Caute, 1983: 384 and 395). These incidents were generally attributed to a breakdown in discipline, but it seems that there were diminishing degrees of selectivity in choosing which white farmers were supporters of the regime and which were not, and whether or not this was relevant. Whilst there may have been distinctions about farmers’ attitudes by some guerrillas, being a philanthropic employer or outspoken opponent of Ian Smith was no guarantee of protection in a war that increasingly failed to distinguish between individuals on either side, or those in the middle.

The extent to which farmers tolerated, or may even have helped guerrillas, is difficult to research. Tim Peech illustrated that ‘arrangements’ between farmers and guerrillas could and did exist - in return for not attacking farmers, ZANLA forces were not ‘followed up’ by local farmer reaction sticks. Tom Wigglesworth, a farmer from the eastern highlands, sheds light on this issue in his account of being marched to Mozambique after being abducted by ZANLA captors. During interrogations, he was berated for not helping the comrades (Wigglesworth, 1980: 29-31 and 115). One ZANLA official apparently declared “many white farmers are helping us… you do not believe me. Do you know (interrogator then mentioned the names of

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16 Interview with John Strong, Harare, February 2002. Strong claims that his family had a long and mutually beneficial relationship with local communities.

five white farmers from the Eastern Districts) they are all helping us with food and do not report us. They will not be attacked.” He heard this many times during his captivity, which raised questions: “white helpers… farmers… some of them were very vociferous supporters of Smith and the Rhodesian Front… It couldn’t be true… or could it?”

Cauté (1983: 299 and 384) also makes reference to white farmer’s helping ZANLA and even of becoming ZANLA informers, but again names are not mentioned. Garfield Todd on Hokonui Ranch, and Guy Clutton Brock at Cold Comfort Farm, supported and fed liberation forces for more fundamental ideological reasons, but there were obviously more farmers tolerating, aiding or abetting the guerrilla forces. There were strong rumours towards the end of the war, that prominent financiers of the Rhodesian Front, such as DC “Boss” Lilford, were supporting ZANU as an insurance policy.

Attacks on commercial farmers were not restricted to whites: Ranger and Ncube (1996: 49) record the targeting of influential or entrepreneurial blacks in rural areas, many of whom ran farms as businesses. Cauté (1983) similarly draws attention to ZIPRA and ZANLA’s offensive against rural black entrepreneurs and farmers in Matabeleland North. Phimister (1988: 12) describes targeted offensives on African Purchase Area farmers by peasants and guerrillas, and on shopkeepers after the internal settlement. Gary Magadzire, President of the AFU, repeatedly lodged concerns about the impacts of war on black commercial farmers, who were singled out by guerrillas as collaborators.

Whereas white farmers received significant support from a government intent on keeping them on the land and maintaining their hegemony, including 90 percent compensation for any war related losses, black farmers bore the full brunt of the war, the economic situation and a severely distorted competitive environment. In much the same way that the costs of the 1930s depression and UDI were borne by black producers, so the costs of the war were shifted onto these sectors, a blatant contradiction of the ‘hearts and minds’ strategy.

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18 Wigglesworth refused to disclose the names of the farmers that he had been given.
19 Interview with Costa Pafitis, Thetford Estate, January 2005.
21 The Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act reimbursed farmers for 90 percent of war-related financial losses.
22 Based on British counter-insurgency tactics in Malaya, winning the confidence and support (hearts and minds) of rural communities was prioritised, to undermine support for insurgents. Protected Villages (PVs) were another example of counter productive strategies. The British used forced villagisation relatively successfully in Malaya, but Rhodesia’s PV’s had more in common with schemes in Vietnam, China and Mozambique. It was a brutal system in which more than half a million people were forced into 230 compounds, creating over 100 000 refugees (Brand, 1981: 49). JP Wilkinson, Director of Veterinary services claimed that “the whole policy has effectively created a pool of resentment which will inevitably cause the whole population to support terrorists at every opportunity” (Godwin and Hancock, 1993:108). In much the same way that the dislocating nature of the Land Husbandry Act became an effective recruiter for nationalism, so the PV policy encouraged thousands of young men and women to join the guerrilla movement.
1.2.4 The Breakdown of Farmer Morale

Military ‘call-up’ was obligatory for all able white males and became an increasingly contentious issue, in which poor administration was exposed and publicly criticized. In a well-known anecdote, a Centenary farmer was sent to Chipinge to guard the property of an owner who had concurrently been drafted to Centenary.23 Young, un-established farmers in ‘hot areas’ such as Centenary, could not afford the time or the security risk of being off their farms for extended periods and this growing debate is regularly referred to in RNFU council minutes.24

When the call-up parameters changed in 1977, extending the upper age limit from 38 to 50 and extending the national service requirement from twelve to eighteen months, opposition to the draft also began to emerge from the city, particularly from urban business owners and directors (Caute, 1983: 143). After 1978 it was possible for farmers in ‘hot areas’ to get exemptions, but the increasing strains on manpower and resources reflected widening cracks in the system. The minutes of the RNFU Marondera branch meeting, in February 1978, record that

…there are growing signs of a lowering of morale amongst the farming community. A combination of the ever-increasing security threat, political uncertainty and producer price factors are largely responsible for this state of mind. 25

The war experience initially united farming communities, through shared experience and a sense of patriotism and duty. The nature of this solidarity was articulated by Margaret Strong, wife of the RNFU President John Strong, in her address to the RNFU Congress in 1979, when she spoke on behalf of farmers’ wives, describing the changes that the war had brought to their lives.26 Increasing domestic security and practical farming responsibilities had, to a large extent, been assumed by farmers’ wives because call-ups were keeping men away for longer. Most farmer’s wives also ‘volunteered’ for the Police Reserve, which involved administrative duties such as manning radio centres. Caute (1983: 229) compared this to the Israeli conscription of women and noted its ‘bonding’ effects and contribution to the siege mentality in that country.

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23 This story was substantiated in a discussion with Chris Pohl (Centenary farmer), Harare, 2003.
25 Extract from the Marandellas Branch Report, Minutes of the RNFU Council Meeting, 21/22 February, 1978
Margaret Strong also described the mounting burden of stress. The increasing threat of landmines and attacks, the rising incidents of sabotage, the pressure of financial difficulties and intimidated work forces all undermined resolve.\textsuperscript{27} She conveyed how the strains of the war were affecting women, which was then compounding the weariness within farming communities:

> the greatest burden that the wives have to bear …is the burden of worry…an ever present anxiety, never far from the forefront of her mind… and we pray that this war will soon end, and with it an end to all the suffering and bloodshed (CFU, 1991: 35).

Godwin and Hancock (1993) and Caute (1983) draw attention to increased incidences of alcoholism, social violence and immorality - a general deterioration of behaviour amongst whites. This undermined morale and inevitably led to greater levels of stress-related illnesses within the farming community.\textsuperscript{28} Deteriorating standards of living under these conditions forced most farmers, at varying paces and extents, to realize that a continued defiance was not just impractical, but impossible.

### 1.2.5 Economic and Financial Pressures

The impact of the economic downturn during the war also influenced the shift from defiance to surrender. Precipitated by the OPEC crisis in October 1973, global commodity prices slumped considerably and the costs of importing petroleum increased sharply. This had marked effects on the Rhodesian economy, which import-substitution could no longer resolve (Hatendi, 1987). The detailed impact of sanctions is difficult to quantify accurately. Isolation may have encouraged economic restructuring and increased import substitution, whilst the motivation of sanctions-busting activities certainly helped to unite the Rhodesian cause. However, sanctions forced Rhodesia to sell in the cheapest international markets and to buy in the most expensive. Over time, import substitution required sustained net imports of raw materials to maintain production (Hatendi, 1987). Rising defence expenditure placed enormous strain on an increasing budget deficit, which when coupled with diminishing foreign exchange earnings, exacerbated a balance-of-payments crisis and forced the impact of the war into every sector, enclave and home in Rhodesia.

\textsuperscript{27} The intimidation of work forces became a key strategy for ZANLA, who would enter worker villages at night, or issue threats indirectly through the families of farm workers in neighbouring TTLs.

\textsuperscript{28} Discussion with Dr Fran Fussell (Farmer’s wife and Medical Doctor), Harare, January 2003.
Figure 1.2 Defence Spending as a Proportion of National Budget (R$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971/72</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>30m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972/73</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>50m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975/76</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>120m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977/78</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>220m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978/79</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>400m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Godwin and Hancock (1993); Caute (1983: 40 and 187); The Military Balance (1975-1980).

Between 1973 and 1975 short-term overdraft borrowing by farmers increased from R$79 million to R$120 million. Stock theft increased markedly: 26,000 head of cattle were rustled in 1977, 40,000 in 1978 and 92,000 in 1979 (Caute 1983: 205). Grundy and Miller (1981) describe burgeoning incidents of on-farm sabotage such as fence-cutting and the burning of crops and tobacco barns. At the 1975 Congress, RNFU President Paddy Miller, who was also MP (RF) for Mazowe, pointed out that whilst yields and prices had fallen, input costs had risen by 43% in 18 months.29 This initiated a full-scale debate on the economic, logistical and social impacts of the war. It was the first discussion of its sort in an open forum and led to negotiations for guaranteed producer prices. Significantly, it indicated that farmers were prepared to question the direction of the war and the manner in which it was being run. Ian Smith was the Guest of Honour.

In 1978 the RTA estimated that production costs had increased by 18 percent annually since 1974, compared to a 1.2 percent annual price increment over the same period. The RTA council stated that “the tobacco industry face(s) its gravest economic crisis to date and urge(s) action to be taken to ‘give growers something to grow for’, if they (are) to survive” (Mbanga, 1991: 173). Don Bulloch, RTA President, stated in his 1979 Congress address that “the financial viability of our growers has not in any way improved and many are very much worse off. The number in a critical financial position has grown alarmingly”.30 According to Stoneman (1981: 133 and 136) only 2,600 farmers (less than half) were profitable enough to pay tax in 1976 and only 1,419 in 1977. Riddell (1980) claimed that by 1978 forty percent of commercial farmers were technically insolvent, despite heavy subsidies.31

29 Minutes of the 1975 RNFU Congress, Bulawayo.
31 Tobacco farmers alone were effectively receiving R$20 million in subsidies every year (Morris-Jones, 1980).
When negative economic realities and financial pressures added to the mounting security concerns of the war, farmers, irrespective, of their ideological stances, were less willing to sit back and let events unfold. Despite a variety of farmer positions, the combined factors of security threats, viability concerns and political uncertainty made compromise and settlement increasingly acceptable, and these became uniting factors.

1.3 COMMERCIAL FARMERS AND THE SHIFT TOWARDS SETTLEMENT

1.3.1 The Immobility of Farmer Investments

Godwin and Hancock (1993: 119) argue that central to white Rhodesian resistance was the concern that black rule would threaten a privileged way of life. They describe white Rhodesians as “materialists rather than moral crusaders … whose version of reality prepared them to enjoy the good and to absorb or deflect the unpleasant”. Economic self-interest as the key reason behind farmer strategies remains a common feature of the literature, but is an inadequate explanation. A fundamental component of farmer resistance to change or ‘defiance’ was the inflexibility of their positions. Unlike many white farmers in Kenya, very few had any form of financial security outside the country, most felt that their skills had limited transferability and many were unwilling to relinquish proximity to friends and family. For many farmers, their farms were their pensions and foreign currency restrictions compounded their immobility, which probably united the broad farmer position more than any other.  

Rhodesian defiance before the transition consisted of differing proportions of a variety of factors: blinkered prejudice, suspicion of the British Government, concerns about black rule, resistance to the threat of losing a privileged way of life and concerns about more fundamental social displacement. At this stage factors of unity outweighed any divisive features, explaining the peculiar ability of a disintegrating society to portray itself as a single unit and bolster the illusion of homogeneity from within and without.

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1.3.2 Farmer Pro-activity

Direct exposure to the mounting pressures of the war, combined with the growing realisation that the RF was increasingly directionless, encouraged farmers towards compromise. International business and the tobacco industry had always opposed UDI and the resulting economic and diplomatic isolation. However, it was not until farming representatives openly started calling for a settlement that tangible progress began to materialise.\(^{33}\)

The farming community was always divided on this issue. Most tobacco farmers had opposed UDI, whereas non-exporting cattle and maize farmers did well from it. However, the combination of security and economic pressures placed everyone in a similar predicament and this fostered change. The RNFU’s election of John Strong to vice-President in 1974 and President in 1976, by predominantly RF leaning councils, suggested a growing willingness for dialogue and communication. Strong’s immediate predecessor was Paddy Millar, the staunch RF Member of Parliament for Mazowe. Strong was relatively young, but renowned as a grassroots diplomat and a skilled negotiator. According to Denis Norman, Strong’s proposer, Vice-President and successor, “he was known as a bit of a lefty by farmers on the right” and his elevation to the RNFU hierarchy caused some consternation among the regional councillors.\(^{34}\)

The RNFU council at this stage consisted of a combined structure of regional representatives, and commodity representatives. The former were elected by farmers’ associations at grassroots level and, in Norman’s view, were generally more right-wing. The latter were elected by the urban-based commodity associations in a relatively progressive environment, on merit rather than sentiment. There were still ‘right-wingers’ in council particularly among regional representatives and domestic-oriented cattle and grain producers, but the general profile of the farming leadership was undoubtedly moderating.\(^{35}\)

Strong had worked his way onto the RNFU council as Vice-President of the Rhodesia Tobacco Association (RTA) and was put forward by a growing group of young, moderate RNFU commodity councillors, who would play a significant role in agricultural leadership over the next decade.\(^{36}\)

Strong’s journey to Zambia in 1975 with Sandy Fircks (ex-RTA President) to meet President Kaunda demonstrated this new style of leadership. Fircks was outspoken, anti–RF, and had

\(^{33}\) Influential figures such as CG Tracey, a tobacco house owner and sanctions buster played a key role in trying to seek a compromise.
\(^{34}\) Interview with Denis Norman, Sussex, October 2004.
\(^{36}\) These included: Sandy Firks, Denis Norman, Jack Humphries, David Spain, Jim Sinclair and John Laurie.
always opposed UDI. He emphasised to Kaunda that the farming community was ready for majority rule and were willing to work with a black government. Fircks also claimed that at least 70 percent of the farming leadership shared this view.\textsuperscript{37} They were even willing to consider land nationalisation under a lease-back system, but warned Kaunda that should wholesale land expropriation take place, they would resist. They were therefore willing to encourage transition so long as they were guaranteed continued access to their land. Godwin and Hancock (1993: 125) argue that “they simply told Kaunda what the business community had been saying for a decade – the wealthier more progressive sectors of white Rhodesia could handle political reform”, with conditions. It also showed that prominent farmers were willing to pursue independent political initiatives.

Strong saw the benefits of lobbying other groups and tabled the idea of a merger with the African Farmers Union (AFU), which represented about 9000 African Purchase Area farmers and more prominent small-scale black producers. AFU President Gary Magadzire had worked closely with the RNFU leaders over issues such as producer prices and formed close ties with Strong.\textsuperscript{38} Magadzire was viewed more sceptically by the nationalists after bluntly remarking that their overriding objective was the acquisition of power.\textsuperscript{39} He initially rejected Strong’s proposals to amalgamate the two unions, on the basis that there were too many fundamental differences between their agricultural systems and that the AFU preferred a degree of autonomy.\textsuperscript{40} The AFU was, however, willing to share a single office block with the RNFU, in the interests of working together. This laid the foundations for the 1982 agreement to form a single agricultural union, which was prevented by the new government.\textsuperscript{41}

Strong knew there was a consistent danger in getting too far ahead of his council on the reform agenda and recalled some “difficult patches and some extremely difficult moments”.\textsuperscript{42} One of his first contentious moves as President in 1976, was to proclaim the RNFU’s willingness to discuss an inclusive, participatory land and agricultural policy with the nationalists. This created uproar in conservative white circles and prompted several heated off-the-record arguments behind the closed doors of the RNFU executive meetings, in which he was allegedly accused of

\textsuperscript{37} Copy of the Report of the trip to Zambia by John Strong and Sandy Fircks (1975).
\textsuperscript{38} Interview with John Strong, Harare, March 2003.
\textsuperscript{39} Minutes of the RNFU Council Meeting, 28/29 March 1978: para 36.
\textsuperscript{40} Address by Gary Magadzire to RNFU Council, 28\textsuperscript{th} March 1978, minutes of the relevant RNFU council Meeting.
\textsuperscript{41} See Chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{42} Interview with John Strong, Harare, March 2003.
being a ‘kaffer-boetie’, a ‘lefty’ and even of conspiring with terrorists. It is worth noting that there was no formal recorded opposition to his moves within the council and that the *Rhodesian Farmer* carries no record of any internal tensions either. Strong had support and his effective leadership of an RF-dominated council indicates that farming attitudes to the war, towards compromise and towards majority rule were changing.

1.3.3 Farmers and the War State

Stoneman and Cliffe (1989: 17) argue that during the pre-war years there was little distinction between the farmer bourgeoisie and the corporatist state. Most policy was shaped by an old-boy network through “a chat at the club”. The settler state had been consolidated by farmer interests, which in turn guaranteed white farmer hegemony. Although UDI and sanctions had, at times, strained the relationship, the only regular public disputes between farmers and arms of the state, were over producer or input prices. At worst Vernon Nicolle would remark: “our relationship with the Ministry is not a happy one”. Civil servants would respond prudently and the matter would subside. According to Ted Osborne such differences involved “more bluster than substance… standard farmer negotiations”. They certainly did not compromise the longstanding arrangement in which the RNFU and RTA councils joined the RF cabinet on an annual fishing competition (Godwin and Hancock, 1993: 74).

However the increasingly autonomous activity of the farmers created frictions between the RNFU and the government. In November 1972, Agriculture Minister David Smith was subjected to what the *Rhodesian Farmer* described as “the toughest meeting of his political career”. Approximately 500 farmers gathered in Umvukwes to debate the financial crisis in agriculture and laid the blame squarely at the feet of his Ministry. The escalation in the war in 1973 resulted in a spate of farmer deaths in Centenary and Mt Darwin, despite reassurances from government that the situation was under control. This prompted severe criticism from farmers at the branch level RNFU meeting in April 1973, in which the competence of the security forces was openly questioned, and the reassurances of the RF were rejected. The 1975 RNFU Congress debate sparked more national public criticism of the RF and the number and magnitude of critical

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43 Interview with John Strong, Harare, March 2003. This was supported by Denis Norman, Sussex, October 2004.
44 Minutes of the RNFU Council Meeting, 2 May 1979, para 9.
46 *The Rhodesian Farmer*, 10 November 1973, p.3.
remarks in the RNFU council meetings increased. For example, in March 1974 there were: “growing concerns at whether government is doing enough to improve and manage the security and viability concerns of the farmers”. By 1977 the Victoria Branch of the RNFU simply submitted a vote of no confidence in the government. By 1979, the RNFU council concluded that: “a government could not be expected to legislate against its own ineptitude or any anticipation of an inability to govern and control situations”.

The RF had been alarmed by Fircks and Strong’s intentions to meet Kaunda, by their willingness to engage with the nationalists, and by the obvious intentions to plan for commercial agriculture under majority rule. The RF was also deeply concerned by the growing farmer-led public criticism which emanated out of the 1975 congress debate. David Smith was also alarmed by the RNFU’s increasingly independent lobbying during the settlement negotiations of 1978 and 1979.

Strong and Jack Humphries (RNFU Director) provided the AFU with funding in the late 1970s, to alleviate the constraints on the union and also to establish an alliance as part of the lobbying exercise. This initiative had support from council but met with government resistance at the time: “the Ministry… went beserk…for the simple reason that they had more control over (African) agriculture when the (African) farmers union was financially dependent on government – our move threatened that!”. Ted Osborne, Secretary for Agriculture at the time, suggested that the RNFU was undertaking roles and initiatives with wider political implications than their mandate allowed. This demonstrated elements of conflict between and within the institutions of white Rhodesia. The state began to suffer from a crisis of legitimacy as farmers, a traditional ‘cornerstone’ of the state and the Rhodesian Front, increasingly voiced their disgruntlement.

The RF’s agenda, UDI and the deteriorating security situation had moulded the growth, centralisation and authoritarianism of the Rhodesian state. Less obvious, but equally important, were significant power shifts within the white political structure after 1972 – an evolution of power loci within the Rhodesian state. Both the military and civilian bureaucracies initially grew in terms of size and influence and bolstered the commercial farmer position through subsidies and material support. Cliffe (1981: 12) argues that during difficult times there was a blurring

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49 Minutes of the RNFU Council Meeting, 22/23 February 1977, para 132.
50 Minutes of the RNFU Council Meeting, 27/28 March, 1979, para 23.
51 Interview with Ted Osborne, Durban, April 2003.
53 Interview with Ted Osborne, Durban, April 2003.
between the state and the white farming community and that the *first chimurenga* was doused by mobilizing settlers. To a large extent the *second chimurenga* was also fought in this manner. Keeping farmers on the land was a crucial element of the Rhodesian cause.

Cliffe (1988:321) argues that the political clout of the farmers weakened during the war, based on the assumption that their financial and security positions deteriorated and that, because of their close ties, the weakening of the RF implied a weakening of the RNFU. My analysis suggests otherwise: whilst the RF and the Rhodesian state weakened, the relative power of farmers within the white electorate actually strengthened. Their independent politicking and the increasing criticisms of the various administrative wings of the state were a reminder of the degree of autonomy held by a powerful farmer group, which was clearly losing faith in the ability of the RF to find a solution. The RF had been formed and consolidated as a platform for the protection of white interests, on the basis of close personal ties with members of key interest groups, particularly commercial farmers and domestic capital, but under the pressures of uncertainty about the future, it was difficult to retain these ties exclusively. Big business and international capital had led opposition to UDI and called for settlement throughout, and when the RNFU leadership began to pursue similar strategies, they bore fruit, partly because the state apparatus remained firmly geared towards farmer interests. In this we see a shift in power away from the civilian administration, to a military bureaucracy, towards the farming and business houses.

### 1.3.4 Farmers, the Rhodesian Front and the Opposition

The prominence of farmers, such as DC ‘Boss’ Lilford and Lord Angus Graham, in founding the RF was largely responsible for perceptions that it was a farmers’ party. However, farmers had dominated the hierarchies of different political parties, including the UFP, and featured across the political spectrum. The Centre Party (CP) was founded by Pat Bashford, a tobacco farmer from Karoi, and led by a group of young farmers and professionals, but had suffered a series of disappointments, including the rejection of the 1969 Constitution and the Pearce Commission (Hancock, 1984: Chapter 5). The party attracted intellectuals, liberals and many of the farmers that had made up the Capricorn Society and the United Federal Party. Hancock (1984) argues that it was an attempt to return to a Whitehead-type administration, that it failed to read the changing nature of the white electorate, and was unable to curb the influence and popularity of the Rhodesian Front.
The founding of the Rhodesia Party (RP) in 1973 by Roy Ashburner, another wealthy farmer from the North East, was an attempt to change the direction of Rhodesian politics and to rescue it from the growing ‘excesses’ of the RF and the Nationalists.\(^{54}\) The RP portrayed itself as ‘moderate’ rather than ‘liberal’ in the hope of attracting what they hoped to be a sizeable swing vote. This was expected to emerge from the ‘pragmatic’ and moderate sectors of the RF as the pressures of war, economic downturn and diplomatic isolation grew. Farmers such as Oliver Newton, John Meikle and Strath Brown saw themselves as pragmatists rather than liberals, and always insisted on this distinction.\(^{55}\) It did not isolate them from the Rhodesian Front’s increasingly narrow brand of patriotism, which totally excluded the CP, but allowed them to distance themselves from the excesses of the ‘hard-line’ elements.

However, ‘progressive’ leadership, seemingly accepted within the farming institutions, was greeted with suspicion within the general white electorate. Alan Savory, a charismatic young agricultural consultant and rancher from Matetsi, abandoned the RF and was elected leader of the RP in 1973. Savory may have understood the political undertones of the day, but not how to articulate them to a fickle electorate and repeatedly upset the RF with his bold predictions of civil war. Savory’s self-righteousness, hot temper and messy divorce were windfalls for the RF propaganda machine which quickly neutralised the political effectiveness of the RP (Godwin and Hancock 1993; Caute, 1983). For all his talents, Savory was a loose cannon and an ineffective team player – both the party’s albatross and its opportunity.\(^{56}\) Savory’s increasingly alarmist, but retrospectively accurate, views went beyond his constituency. His impatience and frustrations with “the narrow-minded delusions of too much of white Rhodesia” took him too far ahead of his potential support base and he lost the RP leadership to the more compromising Tim Gibbs.\(^{57}\) Savory later returned as leader of the National Unifying Force (NUF), a CP-RP coalition, but again isolated himself in 1978 and was forced to resign.\(^{58}\)

Caute (1983: 148 and 270) criticised the “minority culture of Rhodesian liberalism” and argues that despite their stated insistence to the contrary “often their faith in African efficiency, tenacity and integrity was minimal”. He also felt that they were utterly powerless and evoked the aura of a group of hobby politicians, who merely dabbled in the political arena (Caute, 1983: 212).

\(^{54}\) Roy Ashburner was a national cricketer and became President of the ZTA in 1980-1982.
\(^{55}\) E-mail correspondence with John Meikle, May 2005.
\(^{57}\) E-mail correspondence with Alan Savory, July 2003.
\(^{58}\) Discussions with Tim Gibbs, Gloucestershire, April 2002.
Hancock (1983) also criticised the capacity of the liberal/moderate coalition, claiming that white Rhodesia was divided, but only across a narrow spectrum. Godwin and Hancock (1993:111) argue that the divisions were more significant, but lament the inability of the Rhodesia Party to capitalise on them:

It was obvious that a collective and determined resistance to ‘terrorism’ was not sufficient to unite the farming communities at the ‘sharp end’…yet also apparent that a liberal party could not manipulate those divisions by telling some home truths.

While dwelling on the obvious ineffectiveness of white liberals, it is important to understand the ability of the RF to retain support, given their increasingly exposed shortfalls. Many liberal and moderate attitudes hardened as the tempo and brutality of the war increased. After Lady Wilson’s agricultural school in Manicaland was burnt down by “ZANLA thugs”, she grew cynical about the nationalist agenda (Caute, 1983: 224). Likewise, Caute (1983: 395) noted the hardening attitude towards ZANLA in the Penhalonga area, following the murders of several progressive farmers. Alan Ravenscroft, who had his grower support initiatives in Chiweshe sabotaged by nationalist ‘agitators’ in the 1950s, argues that the disruption and targeting of Purchase Area farmers during the war, raised his own concerns about nationalist goals. This response to guerrilla tactics and scepticism of the nationalist agenda, cut across the divisions in white society and prolonged ‘white’ resistance. The Red Cross rebuked both sides for callousness and degenerating discipline but guerrilla tactics and indiscipline hardened the resolve of many farmers. The targeting of vulnerable homesteads, particularly the elderly, fortified white stereo-types of ‘cowardly communist terrorists’. Caute (1983:253) and Phimister (1988) described deteriorating discipline within the guerrilla armies and particularly ZANLA. When the civilian airliner Hunyani was shot down by ZIPRA guerrillas in 1978, most of the survivors were executed afterwards. Nkomo’s televised celebration of the incident sent ‘white’ sentiment into a frenzy. A gruesome series of mission massacres, particularly at Elim, convinced many

59 Interview with Alan Ravenscroft, Concession, August 2001.
60 Most farmer respondents claim that they perceived the communist threat as a real concern during this period. Guerrilla brutality towards black civilians, which Kriger (1992) cites as a cause of peasant-guerrilla animosity, was seized upon by the Rhodesian propaganda machine. Flower (1987) describes this propaganda exercise, and its clever distortion of real issues. The effectiveness of the campaign within the white population, was based on covering up the controversial tactics of the Rhodesian security forces and in many cases attributing them to guerrillas. Towards the end of the war the guerrilla armies began using similar media tactics in international forums.
61 The deterioration of discipline within the Rhodesian Security Forces is also documented. See Moore King (1988).
whites that a Congo-style collapse was possible. On one hand this boosted emigration rates, but on another it fortified Rhodesian resolve and support for Smith. This idea of a common enemy slowed the disintegration of white society, increased scepticism of the nationalist agenda and prolonged white Rhodesian intransigence.

Although financially and socially influential, farmers only made up about ten percent of the white electorate during the mid and late 1970s. In many rural constituencies the relatively high proportion of white artisans, miners and civil servants diluted farmer voting. There were approximately 6000 registered white farmers in Rhodesia in the early 1970s and it is difficult to accurately gauge their patterns of political support or apathy. Peer pressure was certainly a factor in many circles. Gyles Dorward, a prominent tobacco farmer, described “an intimidating pro-RF atmosphere at Salisbury South… (where) you were either with them or against them”. Bill McKinney described similar peer intimidation in Matabeleland. Both explained that there was little tolerance of alternative view-points and little distinction between patriotism and being a member of the RF. On the other hand the Mtoko farming district, also a tobacco growing area, consistently voted against the RF throughout UDI (Hancock, 1984). Other districts, such as Mazowe, reflected a more balanced and variable electoral pattern. Gyles Dorward distinguished between “those farmers taking the pragmatic business angle… (as opposed to) those on the political route”. The RF appears to have sustained its support in those farming districts least affected by the war, such as Trelawney, Salisbury South and Matabeleland whilst those under the worst pressure such as Manicaland, Centenary, Mtoko and Umvukwes were often the most prepared to question the government.

The wealthy mixed-farming region of Sinoia/Umvukwes posed an interesting test in a 1974 by-election following a spate of attacks on farmers in Centenary and Mt Darwin. Angry farmers and the RNFU rejected government’s assurances and publicly questioned the competence of the security forces. It was expected to be closely fought. Es Micklem, a tobacco and cattle farmer, ran for the RF against Strath Brown, the RP candidate, also a prominent tobacco grower. Pat Bashford flew the ‘liberal’ flag as the CP nominee. Accounts of the proceedings, held at

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62 Elim Pentecostal Mission in Manicaland was attacked and thirteen members of missionary families, including four children, were hacked to death. Although Mugabe blamed the Selous Scouts for the massacre, Com-Ops claimed that there was indisputable evidence linked to ZANLA forces. Maxwell (1995) supports the latter assertion.
65 Discussions with prominent farmers from Mazowe (2002-2004) including Alex Morris Eyton.
Umvukwes Country Club, suggest that Savory was the crucial factor. Rather than capitalising on the RF’s defensive stance he outlined a plan for negotiation with the nationalists, making no attempt to window-dress his alarmist predictions for the conservative audience. Godwin and Hancock (1983:110) felt that he “promptly dared (the farmers) to embrace political oblivion”. Savory put the swing vote to flight. Although the RF retained the seat easily, they lost support, winning 53 percent compared to nearly 65 percent at the previous poll. Farmers made up about one third of the constituency, but were probably responsible for most of this RF defection. The remaining two-thirds of the vote comprised of white artisans, shopkeepers, civil servants and miners, most of whom lived in the relatively secure towns of Umvukwes, Mutorashanga and Sinoia. As the war dragged on and the ineffectiveness of the opposition became apparent many farmers turned towards the RNFU as an alternative political outlet.

Defiant elements within the RF managed to retain influence even though it grew increasingly clear that a ‘no win’ war was rapidly degenerating into what Flower (1987) described as a ‘losing’ war. Towards the end of 1975 there was a strong right-wing move against Smith, orchestrated by Des Frost and Ted Sutton-Price, both urban-based businessmen, with the intention of reverting to an apartheid-style constitution. This incident, at the RF Party Congress in Mutare, involved two consecutive standing ovations, for opposing motions, firstly for Sutton-Price’s challenge to Smith and then for Smith’s defence - a remarkable shift. Ian Sandemann, a tobacco farmer from Trelawney, led a far right 1978 breakaway move with a group of RF MPs, to try and scupper the internal settlement. With a few exceptions, farmers were generally absent from these far-right moves. Godwin and Hancock (1993: 108) argue that the farming right was pro-Smith rather than pro-RF and applied this to much of white Rhodesian sentiment:

> Successive generations …easily led and even more easily deceived… had voted for heroes rather than policies and, lemming-like, thousands followed their greatest hero-‘Good Old Smithy’- into the abyss.

My analysis suggests that it was much more complicated. Farmers, in questioning their financial and security predicaments and challenging the RF, the civilian bureaucracy and the military leadership, were clearly not following anyone. Their historically established ‘individualism’ and ‘self-interests’ were beginning to show through the illusions of unity within the Rhodesian Front.

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1.3.5 Farmer Initiatives for Settlement

John Strong and his deputy, Denis Norman, demonstrated the pragmatism of the commercial farming leaders, by uniting a powerful but diverse interest group and adapting to the winds of change. Strong’s legacy of reformist leadership within the RNFU continued for the next decade. Denis Norman, David Spain, Jim Sinclair and John Laurie were all anti-RF presidents of the RNFU. They were diplomatic, consultative and prepared to implement changes. An influential figure on the executive structure of the farming leadership was Jack Humphries, the director of the RNFU. As a member of the Capricorn Society and a founder of the Centre Party he had been a prominent figure in the evolution of liberal politics. Humphries was respected as a dispenser of wise advice and influenced the young leadership, and through it the RNFU’s willingness to negotiate, compromise and reform proactively.68

While there were elements of resistance to adaptation, the RNFU leadership achieved what the RF leadership had failed to do: they accepted the inevitability of majority rule, prepared to adapt accordingly, and successfully articulated this to their membership who, in turn, extended a mandate for progressive leadership. This provided a subtle, yet effective and expanding political outlet for farmer concerns in the face of increasing scepticism of the RF, and unattractiveness of the left. The RF, despite its rhetoric, was gradually having to moderate its stance, so that by the time Smith delivered his ‘surrender’ speech on 24 September 1976, it had violated its key founding principle - adherence to continued minority rule. Smith’s capitulation was a forced compromise that implied settlement, which changed the position, outlook and strategies of most interest groups. There was a three-way split within the white community: those still opposed to the principle of majority rule, those proposing it, and a large group still undecided but prepared to follow Smith in order to ‘wait and see’. The relative size of these groups was changing too, as Smith demonstrated in his own gradual shift from defiance, through a phase of indecision towards reluctant surrender. Godwin and Hancock(1993: 152 and 180) describe Smith’s evolution from an “unbending supremacist to a clever bargainer” and how Government objectives shifted accordingly, initially towards trying to secure an internal settlement. Smith immediately re-engaged with the British, calling on them to meet their responsibilities in helping to negotiate the transition to majority rule. This realignment served two purposes: firstly, to secure financial guarantees and an influential place at the table during the transition negotiations.

68 David Hasluck, CFU Director 1983-2003, and Humphries’ successor insisted that the successful repositioning of commercial farmers had much to do with the calibre of the leadership during this period. Interview with David Hasluck, Nyanga, March 2003.
and, secondly, to isolate the ‘external’ nationalist groups - whilst preparing the stage for settlement with the ‘internal moderates’. From the British perspective, Rhodesia’s submission permitted recognition once more. Both Whitehall and Salisbury now shared the common objectives of securing as many guarantees and conditions as possible through a negotiated settlement.

The farmers began to lobby independently to ensure their own position of strength in the settlement. A delegation comprising the ‘Five Economic Presidents’, including the Heads of Commerce, Industry, Mining, Agriculture and Tobacco, travelled to the Geneva Conference in October 1976. The talks were focused on the Kissinger proposals and although they collapsed, the fringe negotiations between farming and business leaders, the British and some nationalists contributed to the ‘success’ of the subsequent negotiated transition.\(^69\) Flower (1987: 173) described the farmer lobbying at the time as “an entirely new development in Rhodesian politics”. In effect the private sector by-passed the government delegation and the RF, indicating a shift in white decision-making power towards a growing coalition between foreign capital and domestic farming.

Denis Norman was invited to Nairobi during the Geneva Conference, to gain an impression of the Kenyan land reforms. This tour and its timetable were organised and paid for by the British government. Norman was introduced to farming leaders, and the captains of commerce and industry in an exercise designed to convince him that a white community could prosper under black rule.\(^70\) He was impressed with the system of gradual land transfer and soon afterwards the RNFU published a land policy paper advocating managed market-based reform, which was the first formal promotion of the willing-buyer willing-seller concept.\(^71\) Strong was invited on an extended trip to the UK in May 1977 during which he lobbied for farmer guarantees. This trip was also a British opportunity to lobby non-RF white interests.\(^72\)

Farming leaders were faced with two options: firstly, to pursue a managed land buy-out with remittable compensation, as in Kenya, or secondly, to keep farming if the conditions allowed. Most farmers considered their farms as their pensions and there was much debate about the

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\(^69\) According to Dr Kumbirai Kangai (Interview: Harare, December 2003) and Denis Norman (Interview: Sussex October 2004), this was the first time that the farmers and the nationalists had a chance to assess the respective land policy visions of the other groups.

\(^70\) Interview with Denis Norman, Sussex, October 2004.

\(^71\) Minutes of the RNFU Council Meeting, 25/26 January 1977, para 134 and Paper cyclo no. 8852/11.

\(^72\) Minutes of the RNFU Council Meeting, 22/23 February 1977, para 129.
transferability of assets as a central clause in the settlement agreement. The leadership felt that their initial responsibility was to those members who wished to stay and to the industry, and that they should therefore encourage the protection of property rights and promote a long-term vision for commercial farming. This also suited the British because it was likely to be less disruptive and less expensive.

A whole-hearted drive for compensation by farmers would have destroyed confidence in the farming sector, the economy, and the future of the country as a whole. Some land reform was inevitable and concerns were expressed by the RNFU Council over differences between the proposals of the ‘Zimbabwe Development Fund’ and the ‘Kissinger Trust Fund’, and the vagueness of the clauses relating to land policy and compensation. RNFU Council debates also revealed farmer scepticism of British good-will about potential funding. The Sinoia Farmers’ Association recorded their concern about the lack of a remittance clause for compensation funds in the ZDF document, whilst drawing attention to the ability of civil servants to receive pensions in foreign currency outside the country. John Laurie (RNFU Salisbury Branch Chairman) called for an updated and complete property ownership survey and for a Government Fund to be established as an added guarantee.

The Salisbury Branch, submitted a supporting resolution the following January which emphasised the same concerns about the flexibility of compensation remittances. Like business, farming wanted a settlement as soon as possible, but only with guarantees. The RNFU produced a pamphlet, effectively an updated version of Norman’s land position paper, in response to the Government’s white paper, calling for reassurances about property rights, fair compensation and remittance flexibility. Strategic lobbying became a central role of the Union during the transition, and was an important factor in the repositioning of the farmers. As these efforts increased, so the RNFU’s close ties to the Rhodesian Front diminished. The farming leadership appreciated the need to shape the path ahead proactively, to protect their members’ interests, which Wasserman (1970) identified as a key settler strategy in his analysis of Kenya’s white farmers. Godwin and Hancock (1993) argue that White Rhodesia generally

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74 Interview with John Strong, March 2003 and supported by Denis Norman, October 1994.
75 Minutes of the RNFU Council Meeting, 24/25 January 1978, para 33.
76 Minutes of the RNFU Council Meeting, 25/26 April 1978, para 41.
77 Interview with John Laurie, Harare, March 2003. Also supported in Minutes of the RNFU Council Meeting, 24/25 January 1978, para 112.
78 Minutes of the RNFU Council Meeting, 31 Jan, 1979, para 80.
79 Also cited in Caute (1983: 130).
reacted to pressures of change by reaffirming the values of the past rather than by adapting progressively. The strategic manoeuvring by the farming leadership counters this and has important implications for subsequent farmer pro-activity, particularly during the 1990s.

1.4 THE POLITICS OF SETTLEMENT

1.4.1 International Pressure

Until 1974, Portuguese colonial control of Angola and Mozambique had provided the settler states of Southern Africa with territorial, military and symbolic support. Mozambique’s Independence on 25 June 1975 changed this. FRELIMO’s assumption of power increased Rhodesia’s isolation, exposed the huge eastern border to strategic insecurity and significantly altered the direction and nature of the war. When South Africa and the United States became embroiled in Angola later that year, Zambia began to actively support the guerrilla movement exposing the north-western border (Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989: 30). In December 1974, Vorster persuaded Smith to release prominent detainees, which boosted the organisational capacity of the nationalists.

Smith’s decision to throw in the towel was made for him by the international community. Following the failures of the Wilson talks, the Pearce Commission, the ‘railway carriage’ talks and ongoing peripheral mediations, Henry Kissinger announced a set of proposals and concurrently turned the screws on South Africa, by implying extended sanctions. Vorster subsequently issued an ultimatum to Smith - without South African military support or trade and energy links white Rhodesia was unable to survive much longer, and clearly already unable to control the pace or direction of change.80

1.4.2 The Internal Settlement

After reluctantly accepting Kissinger’s proposals, Smith regained the upper hand when ZANU and ZAPU rejected them at the Geneva talks in October 1976. Mugabe simply ignored them and Edison Zvobgo, a Harvard educated lawyer, described them as “a load of crap”, calling for

80 For a detailed assessment of regional geo-politics during this period see Johnson (1977).
more fundamental reform ‘immediately’. Smith’s compromise countered the confrontational stance of the nationalists and the western media began to demonise Mugabe. Smith took advantage of this to play-off the nationalists and the international community. By reaching consensus with South Africa, the USA, Britain and the internal nationalists, Smith isolated ZANU and ZAPU, portraying them as the ‘unreasonable’ parties. This laid the foundations for an internal settlement with the ‘moderate’ nationalists of the UANC, including Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Chief Jeremiah Chirau and Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, who had lost the ZANU leadership to Mugabe. Smith hoped to engineer a moderate coalition leadership through which to maintain white influence, control and interests.

Having lost the battle to perpetuate white minority rule, they (the whites) voted for a new structure (1979 referendum) which retained their economic control, preserved their jobs, gave them a share of political power and merely removed the legal barriers to black advancement (Godwin and Hancock, 1993: 7).

In return, the moderate nationalists would enjoy some access to power, which the inclusion of the Patriotic Front would have denied them. From the RF’s perspective it was a political concession designed to secure an economic one – an exercise to hand over parliament in order to keep the banks. The RF’s moves towards internal settlement prompted a breakaway by the far right. Godwin and Hancock (1993: 247) described this group as “real hardliners …with a flair for the headmasterly lecture, the racial insult and for spotting communist tendencies lurking in a progressive suggestion”. Under Ian Sandemann’s leadership the Rhodesian Action Party (RAP) was formed in April 1977, and campaigned for apartheid-style segregation in a last-ditch attempt to avoid settlement, which ultimately failed. By this stage though, even the white urban working classes were feeling the direct effects of war and conceded to negotiation (Meredith, 1979)

The interesting feature of the move is the realisation by the extreme right of the RF that there was now a significant and inevitable shift towards compromise within the party and, more importantly, that their best hope of preventing it lay with the artisans, not the farmers, not business and certainly not with the farming leadership – the RNFU broke their policy of political silence to express concerns that the RAP appeal might scupper the settlement process. The call for settlement thus became a uniting factor. The RNFU officially resolved to express their willingness for a settlement at every opportunity, to all interested parties. \(^{81}\) RNFU preparations for settlement and compromise were symbolically demonstrated by an official name change to

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the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) at the 1979 Congress. British and South African capital also lobbied hard behind the scenes for a compromise. Gyles Dorward, President of the RTA, emphasised the tobacco sector’s impatience for settlement. He re-iterated this at the 50th Anniversary Congress in June 1978: “if you want to overcome these problems tomorrow, keep your tobacco men today by resolving your political differences now – Right now!” His successor, Don Bulloch stated the following year: “once sanctions are removed every effort must be made to regain our rightful place in world markets, and the sooner the better”.

There was probably more consensus between domestic and foreign capital, the RF and the liberals, than at any stage since the 1950s. Business houses had lost faith in the left and were now focussed on reforming the RF from within. Hancock (1984) argues that the irrelevance of white liberalism was striking home, and that they were now less interested in opposition politics than in urging Smith towards a settlement. The RF position had moderated and was now virtually identical to ‘The Plan’ submitted by the RP in 1975. The five economic presidents were also firmly behind the settlement. The business houses rallied with the leaders of farming and tobacco, the centre and the left, to push the RF towards settlement. Farmers were openly active in the promotion and administration of the referendum. RTA President Don Bulloch, urged farmers to “get involved” and Norman, now RNFU President, congratulated farmers on their efforts afterwards. The 85 percent approval for the referendum was unsurprising given the organisational mobilisation by farmers and business.

Muzorewa won the 1979 elections with a surprising level of support, subsequently contradicted by the overwhelming lack of it in 1980. Nationalist rejections of the legitimacy of the elections were partially based on frustration at not being able to disrupt the process effectively. For the RF, the success of the referendum, elections and partial power-sharing depended on international recognition, firstly to remove sanctions and, secondly, to curb international support for ZANU and ZAPU and their armed divisions, ZANLA and ZIPRA. This recognition did not materialise. Margaret Thatcher, elected in May 1979, rejected the internal settlement on advice from the

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82 Companies such as Barclays, Anglo American and Lonrho had opposed UDI and despite being forced into managing the war economy, had retained their opposition to the RF. Tiny Rowland, at the same time began negotiating with nationalist leaders in the mid 1970s. His concurrent condemnation of colonialism and sanctions busting activities kept him in favour with both sides. He is credited with helping to facilitate the Lancaster House negotiations but there is little evidence to support this.
86 Minutes of the RNFU Council Meeting, September 1978.
foreign office – a U-turn on her election pledges, but it was clear that without the inclusion of the PF the deal lacked legitimacy (Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989: 31). Her statement, delivered at the August Commonwealth Heads Of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Lusaka, provoked a furious reaction from the Muzorewa government but continued the gradual process of negotiation and compromise, that finally led to the Lancaster House conference.\footnote{The RF-controlled \textit{Herald} newspaper pondered whether she was “a labour MP in drag”.
}

1.4.3 Farmer Lobbying and the Lancaster House Conference

Farming and business leaders welcomed prospects of the Lancaster House Conference, simply because it was a settlement. The consensus to negotiate required compromise from all parties, but the outcome generally favoured the interests of whites who wished to stay.\footnote{In Kenya the process generally favoured those farmers who wished to sell up and leave.}

Most farmers were concerned about whether they would be allowed to continue farming or whether they would receive remittable compensation. The political options for farmers during this period have distinct parallels with the Kenyan settler experience of the 1960s (Leo, 1984).\footnote{Wasserman’s (1976) appraisal traces the interactions between political parties and factions within both settler and nationalist politics, which ultimately led to a negotiated compromise. The less-polarised political environment of Kenya and the close ties between Kenya’s farmers and Whitehall led to a significant land buyout.}

From the nationalist perspective the objectives of the armed struggle had only partially been achieved. A negotiated settlement prevented a military victory, which radical elements desired, and which many moderates have subsequently lamented.\footnote{Interview with Dr Kumbirai Kangai, Harare, December 2003.}

Mugabe yearned to eradicate any vestiges of the previous regime: “we will burn the country to ashes and rebuild it in our own image”.\footnote{Extracts from Mugabe’s Press Statements at The Geneva Conference, October 1976. Cliffe (1981) and Mandaza (1986), among others, also argued that a military victory would have paved the way for more radical restructuring.}

A negotiated settlement restricted possibilities of radical reform, prompting the question as to why ZANU were prepared to negotiate. The reasons appear to be threefold: Firstly, there was pressure from Britain and the frontline states for a settlement, with the threat that material and symbolic support would be withdrawn from an already strained guerrilla war effort. Secondly, after Nkomo’s secret liaisons with Smith came to light, Mugabe realised that he ran the risk of being sidelined and isolated. Thirdly, as Stoneman (1986) argues, the nationalists were not prepared for an immediate and wholesale takeover and did not share clear objectives. They were ideologically inconsistent and, more importantly, lacked the experience or skills for an immediate assumption of administrative power, so a negotiated transition actually suited them.
From a British perspective, the negotiations at Lancaster House went remarkably well. The objectives of the conference were to settle three issues: a ceasefire, elections and independence, and a new constitution. Persuading the various stakeholders to the table, keeping them there, and then securing agreement through compromise, was a remarkable achievement. The British team, led by Lord Carrington, managed to deliver what many had predicted would be impossible. Despite Rhodesia’s external military raids into Mozambique during the conference, the British, in collaboration with Kaunda and Machel, using funding pledges, assurances and threats, convinced the PF that a settlement was the only feasible option.

An important element of the Lancaster House constitution was the ‘Land Clause’ in the Bill of Rights, which prevented the wholesale expropriation of farms, limited compulsory acquisition of under-utilised land and guaranteed remittable compensation. The specific protection of white interests grew from the assumption that their bargaining position was about to diminish significantly. The Patriotic Front rejected the land clause in advance and envisaged immediate large-scale reform without compensation. Denis Norman travelled to London in October to raise support for a managed land program based on his 1976 policy paper. This initiative drew criticism from the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian government delegation who felt that a RNFU (CFU) presence was unnecessary. David Smith queried whether there was a lack of confidence in the delegation and asked “whether Mr Norman thought he could do better than himself and Mr Cronje?”

The CFU’s visit was remarkably effective, attracting Anglo-American financial pledges that were later complemented by vague British assurances through Lord Carrington during the conference. Costa Pafitis (Muzorewa’s Press Officer) claims that the British guarantees were ‘encouraged’ by the Nigerian Government, who threatened to nationalise British Oil companies if they were not forthcoming. These funding assurances were key in persuading the nationalist groups to drop their opposition to the bill of rights clause. According to Denis Norman, Josiah Chinamano reassured delegates that if there were sufficient financial guarantees then ZAPU’s land policy was directly in line with the CFU’s. Both groups could agree,

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92 Smith and Simpson’s (1981) detailed account of the negotiations pays remarkably little attention to the land clause, instead bringing out the significance of the Mugabe-Nkomo split and the pressure of other African states. Likewise Flower’s (1987: Chapter Twelve) otherwise detailed accounts make no mention of the land clause, or its significance in the stalemate.
93 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 31 October 1979.
94 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 31 October 1979.
95 Flower (1987: Chapter Twelve) mentions similar Nigerian pressure on American interests.
97 Minutes of CFU Council Meeting, 31 October 1979, paras 6/7. This was confirmed in an interview with Denis Norman, Sussex, October 2004.
provided there was money, which at a broad level was how the Kenyan settlement had proceeded.

Prior to the conference, the CFU council feared that the government delegation would be too preoccupied with preserving their own interests, such as remittable pension guarantees, to ensure the crucial lobbying for property rights, and Norman again travelled to London, personally attending the conference on the sidelines to ensure that the interests of white farmers were articulated. According to CFU minutes, the purpose of this visit was:

- to ensure a representative interest, to clarify compensation and selection criteria, and
- to alleviate concerns at the ‘various’ positions of the PF, government representatives and indeed the British government”.

It was effective and shrewd diplomacy, conducted in the well-organised manner in which the CFU had lobbied for decades and would continue to do for years to come. Norman was asked to put forward a land policy and once more submitted an updated version of the willing-buyer, willing-seller paper, which the final constitution was based on. The Bill of Rights clause protected the interests of the white farming community and restricted the ability of the inheriting powers to deliver much of the land-based expectation immediately, whilst the debate over funding guarantees remains one of the great unanswered controversies in Zimbabwe’s history.

1.5 THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION

The negotiated political settlement was gradual and staged, involving compromises from all parties, but as De Waal (1990) and Weiss (1994) argue, reconciliation favoured the whites. This may have provided a cornerstone of stability, but enduring land and race inequities remained unresolved. ‘Political neutrality’ had been a guiding principle of CFU policy since the early 1970s, even though their proximity to the RF and the Rhodesian government amounted to an alliance. Their guiding principle to “work with the government of the day” provided a slogan on which to justify their repositioning to an alliance with the Patriotic Front, which was the most visible symbol of settlement and reconciliation for both sides.

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98 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 31 October 1979, added memo 15.
100 This remained the CFU’s default position particularly during difficult periods.
1.5.1 The White Exodus, Farmer Emigration and Incomplete Reconciliation

The euphoria of settlement masked the fragility of Zimbabwe’s ceasefire. The challenges of merging the settler state and the nationalist movement were significant and had not been part of ZANU’s envisaged agenda, although it subsequently suited it. The desire for an outright victory had been central to ZANU’s public position - Mugabe had vowed that he would not let the whites keep a single acre of land. He had also threatened to hang Ian Smith from a lamppost in First Street, so for many whites his speech of reconciliation, delivered on 17 April 1980, was unexpected:

If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with the same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you. The wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten (De Waal, 1990).

Denis Norman’s appointment as the new Minister of Agriculture was another reassuring gesture to whites, and particularly the farming community. It was engineered by Lord Soames and Norman had initially rejected it – he had still not agreed to undertake the role when it was announced. Mugabe clearly viewed it as a pragmatic, technical appointment and this is reflected in a well-known anecdote. When the Prince of Wales arrived in Harare for the Independence Ceremony, Mugabe introduced him to Denis Norman: “my Minister of Agriculture, who knows nothing about politics”. Prince Charles is said to have immediately countered: “well I sincerely hope that he knows something about agriculture”.

However, Norman’s political savvy had already been proven, and he was aware of the implications and responsibilities of his role within a ‘new’ Zimbabwe. In his acceptance speech, on receipt of a farming ‘Oscar’ in 1981, Norman urged white farmers to throw their weight behind “the greatest team of all – government… and the greatest captain of all (Mugabe)” (CFU, 1991:40). The significance of this statement was its attempt to raise farmer confidence in the new government, presumably because he felt that it was still lacking. The farming leadership

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102 Interview with Denis Norman, Sussex, October 2004.
103 Confirmed in an Interview with Denis Norman, Sussex, October 2004.
104 The Farming Oscars are a somewhat incestuous self-congratulatory award, presented annually to a prominent member of the farming community for contributions to agriculture. The decision panel generally consisted of past recipients, dominated by past CFU Presidents.
had negotiated the stormy waters of transition and successfully repositioned the commercial farming sector – this was a call for members to follow.

Thereon, analysis of the CFU archives and the minutes of council meetings reveal an ongoing tension in which the council was often using its close ties with Denis Norman to manage awkward situations or politicians. At the same time, members of the farming groups had to be managed in dealing with sensitive ‘squatter’ problems.\(^\text{105}\) The squatting issue highlighted the simmering undercurrents of unresolved ‘land’ and ‘race’ issues: a demand for land in the communal areas, varying degrees of concern and resistance from white farmers and, perhaps most significantly, a willingness and preparedness within sectors of the ruling party to encourage land protests and defend spontaneous land occupations. A process emerged in which Jim Sinclair and John Laurie were consistently reining in members and concurrently seeking reassurances from approachable members of the government. In this respect Norman provided a useful channel of communication.

Mugabe’s reconciliation pledge was also pragmatic in view of the economy’s dependence on white farmers, who produced 90% of marketed maize and cotton in 1980 (Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989: 130). Food security and a stable economy countered the very real threat of South African destabilisation. Furthermore, reconciliation attracted international credibility, which was needed if funding for reconstruction and development was to be forthcoming.\(^\text{106}\) It is important to understand that Mugabe’s decision to offer the hand of reconciliation countered profound personal misgivings. He had endured significant tragedies; in addition to ten years of detention and a long exile, he had been prevented from travelling to Ghana to attend the funeral of his son, Nhamo, who had died of malaria. Edison Zvobgo described the toll that this had had on Mugabe, who then survived three assassination attempts immediately before the elections in 1980.\(^\text{107}\) Against this his reconciliation must have been pragmatic, conditional and partial.

Enthusiasm for reconciliation varied considerably among other members of the ZANU and ZAPU hierarchy. ‘Moderates’, such as Kumbirai Kangai and Moven Mahachi, seem to have willingly adopted the policy open-mindedly, quickly establishing ties with members of the white communities.\(^\text{108}\) At the other extreme Enos Nkala and Herbert Ushewokunze continued to

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\(^{105}\) Minutes of CFU Council meetings throughout the 1980’s refer to the ‘squatter’ issue.

\(^{106}\) Lord Soames and other African leaders persuaded Mugabe to adopt a reconciliatory stance. Tiny Rowland, the Lonrho chief, is also attributed with moderating ZANU’s stance, although little direct evidence is available.

\(^{107}\) Mugabe, Smith and the Union Jack, Interview with David Dimbleby, BBC Documentary, April 2000.

\(^{108}\) This assertion is supported by most interviews with members of the farming leadership.
publicly vilify whites and other minority groups. Grassroots opinion towards reconciliation is more difficult to gauge but De Waal (1990) implies that there were considerable variations between different regions and experiences.

The white political leadership took on a range of stances towards reconciliation. Ian Smith claimed that he was “overwhelmed by Mugabe’s pragmatism and breadth of vision” and was regularly consulted by the new Prime Minister for nearly 18 months, but continued to criticise majority rule and the deterioration of ‘standards’. According to Denis Norman, Mugabe’s advisors then suggested that he distance himself from Smith as part of the South African diplomatic offensive. PK Van der Byl maintained pessimistic attitudes towards black rule and appeared to adopt a reconciliatory stance in so much as it afforded him the opportunity to remain in the country. For some RF members this was too much: Bob Gaunt bragged in parliament that the Rhodesian Security Forces had never lost a battle or even a skirmish, whilst Don Goddard, a former Selous Scout, apparently urged Mugabe’s ministers to “go back to the bush where you belong” (Caute, 1983: 440). Such incidents may have been isolated but they fanned racial hostility and were seized upon by state propaganda. A rueful John Laurie, former President of the CFU, recently remarked: “all it takes is one insensitive incident or statement to tar the entire farming community with the same brush”.

Other members of the white community chose a similar path to Norman. David Smith, a senior Minister in the Rhodesian cabinet and farmer from Mt Hamden, had defected from the RF, at Lancaster House, and was subsequently appointed Minister of Trade and Industry. Chris Anderson, the prominent lawyer, followed suit and became the First Minister of Justice in the new government. Many prominent members of the white community were prepared to give the nation-building project a try, and the new administration appeared willing to let them.

The changing profile of the white community after Independence has not been analysed sufficiently and attitudes towards reconciliation at grassroots are difficult to gauge. Stoneman and Cliffe (1989: 63) suggest that white artisans were most threatened by racial equality in the job market and constituted the majority of emigrants, many moving to South Africa. Godwin and Hancock (1993), Caute (1984) and Boynton (1994) claim that the ‘die-hards’ and the artisans were the first to leave, implying that the residue of the white population was more moderate. For many Afrikaners, ‘returning’ south was a better alternative than facing black rule. Liberals, moderates and progressives who had welcomed or accepted the prospects of majority rule obviously constituted a greater proportion of whites that stayed. There is also an interesting comparison in the destinations of departing whites – most moved to South Africa or Australia. Virtually all of Kenya’s departing settlers ‘returned home’ to England (Wasserman, 1977).

Although two-thirds of whites emigrated, the total number of white farmers only decreased by about one-third over the same period. The number of urban-based business owners declined even less. According to Stoneman (1981: 136) at least one-third of commercial farmers were technically insolvent in 1979, and this figure may have been as high as forty percent according to Riddell (1981). For many, the uncertainty of staying was not worth the risk, but conversely, those farmers with valuable properties, assets and investments had an added interest in staying. In my Case Study area the farmers who left were all in financial difficulties - not a single successful farmer ‘took the gap’. Interviews suggest that similar patterns prevailed across the

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See Appendix I.

‘Taking the gap’ was Rhodesian slang for emigrating. Those who stayed perceived it as cowardly and unpatriotic.
country.\textsuperscript{113} The high proportion of successful businessmen and farmers, among the 100 000 whites who were still resident by 1985, skewed the ‘wealth-race disparity’ further.

Godwin and Hancock (1993: 250 and 255) felt that white enclaves retained a disproportionate political presence, and a profound commitment to the past. Weiss (1994) accused whites of retreating into their homes and their hobbies. For many whites life did not change drastically and it was easy to resort to pre-war lifestyle routines between the farm and the country club, or the office and the golf course - in effect, continued social isolation.\textsuperscript{114} This also encouraged external perceptions of ‘resorting to the status quo’. But there was a new element of insecurity and indecision within white communities, which Caute (1983: 439) identifies:

whites now suffered a profound sense of alienation – constantly accused by the government and the media of failing to cleanse their minds of colonial attitudes, of clinging to their privileges, of rejecting the great national enterprise of reconciliation.

The sheer weight of history and its established norms of a ‘master and servant’ legacy made it very difficult for blacks and whites to integrate smoothly. Attempts to do so were often awkward, brief and unsuccessful. Whilst CFU Council meeting minutes continued to record member concerns about ‘white-bashing’\textsuperscript{115}, there was clearly an element of expediency within white reconciliation; a ‘wait and see’ approach, which Caute (1983: 130) criticized:

it seems that Rhodesians are Rhodesians when it suits them, masters of their own destiny like Americans or Australians but something else, hybrids of tenderly ambiguous identity when it no longer suits them.

Godwin and Hancock (1993) argued that most whites were too preoccupied with self-preservation to worry about past political attachments. Boyton (1994) pondered the difficulties of finding any whites in South Africa who had supported apartheid, and argued that this applied to whites in Zimbabwe. The euphoria of independence and the cessation of violence undoubtedly contributed to a moment of national unity, but the underlying disparities and tensions soon

\textsuperscript{114} Weinrich (1973: 45) noted that white farmer social isolation was due more to the nature of their lifestyles than any conscious effort.
\textsuperscript{115} This is also conveyed in many of the letters to the Editor of The Farmer magazine.
resurfaced. Large portions of the white population may have gradually accepted the concept of black rule or that changes were afoot, but few appeared to consider the implications of this change or their own responsibilities within it, and as a result there was little attempt to integrate socially or actively overcome other legacies of the race divide.

1.5.2 The 1985 Elections

South Africa’s program of destabilisation in the region added another dimension to race-relations and exposed the insecurities of the new Zimbabwean government, which often resorted to blaming disgruntled whites. The detention of senior air-force personnel, accused of sabotaging Thornhill Airbase in 1983, was a case in point. Blaming South Africa would have acknowledged an act of war and the last thing the new government could afford was direct conflict with their more powerful neighbour. Mugabe’s volatile reaction to British criticism of the detentions exposed a deep resentment and he lost much of his reconciliatory moral high ground with the international press (Martin and Johnson, 1985; Hanlon, 1986).

ZANU PF considered the 1985 parliamentary elections as a direct test of the degree of reconciliation adopted by whites. John Laurie, President of the CFU, tried to persuade Denis Norman to form an opposition party for white moderates and progressives, to run against the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ), a reconditioned RF, for the 20 reserved white seats.116 Laurie envisaged the dangers that a wholesale CAZ victory would have for the reconciliation process. Despite Norman’s widespread respect, as both a Minister and Senator, he declined the role, preferring to remain politically independent on the basis that any perceived politicisation of commercial farming interests might jeopardise their collective bargaining position.117 In any event, the nucleus for white moderates failed to materialise and the CAZ won 15 of the 20 seats. Despite the low turn out, Mugabe accused the white community of retaining their privileged positions without reciprocating reconciliation.118

Scathing reports in The Herald castigated whites for their unreconstructed racism. The insensitivities of what Laurie termed “an unfortunate error” must be contextualised. In October, the previous year, Mugabe had commented: “Our people have not tried to avenge the past… and the whites are still on top economically and in terms of culture…we are not making them suffer

117 Interview with Denis Norman, Sussex, October 2004.
118 The Herald editorial column, June 1985.
because of their past at all” (Alexander, 1993: 164). This statement captured three important aspects of the incomplete reconciliation, firstly that ‘the past’ was still very much a key part of the present, secondly, that there was little distinction between whites, and thirdly, that there was a growing intolerance for continued white privilege and economic dominance.119

White liberals and moderates dismissed the CAZ dominance in the election as statistical misrepresentation, which Mandaza (1986) has criticized. Closer assessment of the white voting by Sithole (1986: 90) and Sylvester (1986) suggest that ZANU PF did overreact. Although the CAZ won 15 out of 20 possible seats they only won 55 percent of the white votes. A low turn out of 34,041 voters out of a potential 75,000 gave CAZ about 25 percent mandate from the eligible white electorate, which cannot be interpreted as sustained hard-line support for Smith, particularly when compared with his 60-70 percent dominance throughout the 1970s. Furthermore, the results of the white-seat elections were not as damming a rejection of ZANU PF as ZAPU’s comprehensive electoral victories in Matabeleland and the Midlands.

The results of the white-seat votes illustrate two important features of white politics: firstly, the inability or disinclination to find an alternative leader - Bill Irvine, who led the IZG alliance, was an ex-RF politician and therefore unsuitable to lead a new white direction, and secondly, the beginning of a virtual withdrawal of whites from public politics. Many commercial farmers claim that they did not bother to vote in the 1985 elections.120 Three reasons were offered: firstly, their impact in the significantly expanded rural constituencies would be negligible; secondly, there was a lack of inspiring choice amongst the white leadership in the twenty reserved seats – Sylvester (1986) specifically noted the uninspiring quality of white candidates; and thirdly it was becoming the vogue to adopt a CFU stance of ‘apoliticism’, to ignore politics and get on with the ‘real task’ of farming. Significantly, there was no obvious pro-ZANU support from white farmers, as would emerge in the 1990 and 1995 elections, and this appears to have been a key reason for Mugabe’s ensuing tantrum.

Following the election results, Mugabe immediately dismissed Norman from the Agriculture portfolio, and John Laurie recalls how he was unable to gain access to the President’s office for at least three months.121 Mugabe wrote to Norman and explained that “obviously the whites have not appreciated what I have done for them, or what you have done for them, and I will

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120 Interviews and discussions with commercial farmers in the case study area, 2002-2004.
121 Interview with John Laurie, Harare, February 2003.
therefore give them a black minister”.

These moments of hostile behaviour indicated that the ruling hierarchy did not distinguish between the farmers and the rest of the white community. Rather, they considered the farmers as the unofficial representatives of the white community, probably due to their high profiles and the legacy of farmer leadership in white Rhodesia. Sylvester (1986:252) noted Nathan Shamuyarira’s reluctance to distinguish between the IZG and the CAZ. Again however, this action was moderate in comparison to the reaction to ZAPU’s victory in Matabeleland, especially after several years of systematic and violent repression. Reconciliation was partial from all sides and, like the defiance and impacts of the war, its nature and scope varied considerably within different groups. This is unsurprising given the magnitude of historical grievances and the perceptions of commercial farmers and businessmen as ‘white islands’, unable to see their added responsibilities in bridging the racial divide. So although the farmers negotiated a successful repositioning with the new government, this convenient arrangement remained awkward and was constantly being undermined.

1.6 CONCLUSION

The transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe was violent, complicated and drawn out. Both sides moved towards a negotiated settlement, in which all parties were required to compromise. The most notable shift among whites was the repositioning of commercial farmers. Autonomous lobbying by the RNFU and RTA leaders with representatives of the frontline states, the nationalist groups and the British government saw a loosening of ties with the Rhodesian Front. Following Independence, the nationalists inherited a powerful and intact state apparatus in which white civil servants in senior positions enforced a process of gradual reform. They assumed most of the technical affairs of governance, which initially suited ZANU’s inexperience.

White farmers suffered some of the worst experiences of the war, but most managed to retain their farms, and as a group they maintained their influence within the evolving power structure. The institutional effectiveness of the RNFU, and certain individuals within it, played an important role. The non-partisan, but increasingly progressive and outspoken RNFU also provided an alternative political outlet for farmers. Contrary to many perceptions, farmers were instrumental in negotiating settlement and compromise. At grassroots level, commercial farmers

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122 Interview with Denis Norman, Sussex, October 2004.
123 More than 200 ZAPU leaders were detained after the 1985 elections and thousands of people were tortured or forced into exile. Had some of the atrocities of the early 1980s not already been exposed, there probably would have been further retribution (Alexander, 1993: 218).
were the first white interest group to experience and to recognise the forces of change. At institutional level they were the first group to challenge the hegemony of the Rhodesian Front.

The political, economic and security crises of the 1970s exposed, accentuated and created divisions within wider white society. Farmers were initially united through shared experiences, through community security and through a widespread belief, transcending their own political, racial and ideological differences, that they were fighting ‘terrorism’. But with time, the war exposed divisions within the farming community at regional, and district levels, as well as on planes of ideology and crop type. Variations in levels of and tolerances to economic and security pressures produced different individual responses. The pattern of farmer emigration also impacted on the profile of the community. Nearly two-thirds of white Rhodesians emigrated but only about one-third of white farmers left during the transition. Farmer emigrants were generally those most exposed financially, those who had suffered the worst experiences of the war and those most ideologically opposed to black rule. By implication, the remaining farmers were wealthier, less averse to majority rule and less divided. Among the wider white population civil servants, artisans and members of the armed forces accounted for a large proportion of white emigrants, with similar implications for the profile of the community that stayed.

This distinct change in the profile of the white population and the farming community raised the relative incomes and social status of most white families. It also increased the visibility and widened the disparity of wealth in comparison to the black population, with significant repercussions for questions of race and reconciliation. Although compromise and a negotiated settlement provided a basis for reconciliation, political stability and economic recovery, and commercial farmers had repositioned themselves successfully, many core issues remained unresolved, including the stark inequities in land access.
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