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The Globality of Islam:
Sharia as a Nigerian “Self-Determination” Movement

Paul Lubeck, Ronnie Lipschutz and Erik Weeks*

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This paper was produced as part of a project at the University of California, Santa Cruz titled Globalization, State Capacity and Islamic Movements. The objective of this paper to assess how globalization and Islam impact the capacity of national states to manage Muslim demands for self-determination expressed either as a call for establishing an Islamic state, an alternative Islamic project or greater regional autonomy. After discussing our general arguments, we turn to an analysis of the Sharia movement for self determination in twelve states located in northern Nigeria, a movement that challenged national identities, provoked inter-communal conflict and threatened the existence of the Nigerian federation.

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* Center for Global, International and Regional Studies
University of California, Santa Cruz, CA 95064
Global@ucsc.edu
We understand the self-determination process to consist of the struggle by a people or group for control over their own destiny. These struggles may have a new secessionist state as their aim (e.g. the struggle for Eritrean independence); or more autonomy and political participation within a nation (e.g. the anti-apartheid struggle South Africa); or a major change in the values and organization of society (e.g. the anti-fundamentalist democratic struggle in Algeria). … A major hypothesis of our project is that these identities, which are constructed or accentuated by local leaders, are often heavily influenced by global cultural forces. (QEH Project Proposal)

Introduction: Globalization, Islam and “Self-Determination” in Nigeria

By way of background to our analysis of Muslim self-determination movements in Nigeria, it may be useful to explain the background of our project. The Santa Cruz project---Globalization, State Capacity and Islamic Movements---analyzes the impact that economic globalization exerts on the capacity of elites in eight national states to manage Muslim self-determination movements. Even before “9-11” effectively tarbrushed all Islamic social movements as “terrorist” in the American imagination, we published a series of papers which guided the propositions posed in our Carnegie proposal. Below is a brief summary of our assumptions and arguments regarding the relationship of globalization and Islamic movements.

(1) The social power of Muslim social and self-determination movements is correlated with the expansion and deepening of an informationally-driven regime of neo-liberal globalization, accompanied by rising social inequality, human insecurity, and disillusionment with the performance of post-colonial national states; (2) Islamism represents an alternative political discourse that is simultaneously national and global, yet grounded in the authentic everyday cultural practices of observant Muslims, while, at the same time, promising them political and cultural liberation from Western hegemony, social justice in this world, and relief from national humiliation; (3) Islamist movements are diverse, pragmatic and modern in that they borrow eclectically from Western-origin organizational forms and political discourses in order to create organizations and deliver services demanded by the large, educated, cohorts of redundant youths residing in dense Muslim cities; (4) all the latter factors combine with the legitimacy crisis of weak, authoritarian states implementing structural adjustment programs so as to allow Islamist movements to capture the mantle of populist, anti-imperialist nationalism, easily the most powerful political resource formerly controlled by secular nationalist and leftist movements; and finally, (5) because information technology networks spearhead contemporary globalization, the new global infrastructures have inadvertently provided a superb communications network through which Islamist movements have constructed a globally networked anti-systemic movement that has proved to be the greatest challenge to the American-inspired project of liberal globalization (Lubeck, 1995, 1999, 2001, 2001) (Lipschutz, 1999) (Lubeck and Lipschutz, 2000).
Rethinking the Globality of Islam

As the project evolved and the global interconnectedness of Muslim movements became apparent, we have moved away from seeing Islamic movements solely as “reactive ethno-nationalist” responses to American-inspired neo-liberal globalization policies, or as veiled popular class responses to widespread dissatisfaction with the dismal performance of the crisis-ridden post-colonial state. To conceptualise Islamic movements as national and local responses to deprivations generated by the effects of neo-liberal restructuring, i.e. reactive ethno-nationalism in Wallerstein’s idiom, invariably defines Muslim movements as reactive, reactionary, anti-modern, and binary oppositions to the neo-liberal restructuring of national societies. While standard social movement theories have considerable explanatory power, they neglect the cultural/discursive and the global dimensions of our problem. Paradoxically, however, we know that Islam’s extensive global networks and transnational discourses predate Western imperialist expansion, the rise of neo-liberal policy, information and communication technologies (ICT), and the disillusionment with and decline of post-colonial secular states. The historical legacy of Islam, therefore, forces us to rethink and reposition the role of Islam within more general theories of globalization.

Relegating Islam to the local and national sites of action, while unconsciously reserving the global site for neo-liberal economic globalization, is not merely hopelessly Euro-centric but profoundly counterfactual. Why? What is most distinctive about contemporary Muslim social activism is neither its local particularity nor its bounded nationality but, rather, its multifaceted and protean globality. Muslim globality is manifest in the growing interconnectedness of spatially-separated Muslim communities, their global awareness of each other, their effort to base social and political action on standardized Islamic discourses, their transnational charity and educational networks and the increasing velocity of cross border flows through Muslim networks—people, scholars, students, finance, goods, media images and ideas. What is new is the innovative organizational strength and pragmatic energy displayed by transnational Muslim networks promoting Islamist discourses and movements operating within the interstitial spaces that are paradoxically opened up by the forces driving neo-liberal economic globalization. In the cultural realm, the globality of the post 1967 Islamic Revival has reintroduced concepts such as the Muslim nation and the transnational ummah, rendering a global Muslim identity one of several identity options available to the world’s Muslims (Hall, 1996).

Accounting for the autonomous and extensive globality so manifestly present in contemporary Islamic movements requires a repositioning of Muslim structures of globalization in our cognitive map. To correct this methodological flaw, an adequate explanation must not limit globality solely to neo-liberal forms of economic globalization, marked by their indelible American slant, rather it should allow for the autonomous impact that a conscious and autonomous global Islam exerts on local and national movements. Only by integrating the global and local dimension of Islam will one explain the impact that long standing transnational Islamic institutions, networks and discourses exert on the nature of national and local movements operating in states like
Nigeria. The test of this theoretical repositioning depends upon our ability to compare global Muslim movements to their Western counterparts. Practically this means we must show how transnational Muslim networks and discourses impact Muslim social movements in national states like Nigeria, with the same analytic clarity that Keck and Sikkink demonstrate for the effect that transnational advocacy networks exerted on transnational emancipatory movements championing abolitionism, gender equity, human rights and environmental sustainability. (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

We resolve the tension between economic globalization and global Islam by conceptualizing them as mutually constitutive social forces operating at the global level, each with its own domain of power. While neo-liberal economic globalization dominates production, technology and warfare, global Islam operates through the social and cultural politics of a “moral economy”, envisioning a transnational and national polity that conforms to Islamic norms if not an Islamic state. At the current moment, both struggle for hegemony and discursive power within national states, yet both are networked into a powerful arsenal of global institutions and discourse operating above the nation-state. At its core, global liberalism is a discourse privileging freedom, self-interest, accumulation, growth, innovation, efficiency, consumerism and individual responsibility within the confines of the nation-state. In contrast, Islam is a discourse privileging community, social justice, redistribution, enterprise, social regulation, membership in a transnational community and, in practice, a claim for national autonomy vis a vis the hegemonic powers managing the capitalist world economy. Ontologically, therefore, they are complementary rather than inevitably competitive with many significant overlapping similarities.

Ironically, the technological success of neo-liberal globalization has inadvertently strengthened the communication capacity, interconnectedness, cultural autonomy and self-awareness of the spatially dispersed members of the global Muslim community. Muslims resist some, but certainly not all, aspects of the economic, political and cultural agenda promoted by neo-liberalism, and this resistance takes global forms often using the global infrastructure of economic globalization. As we shall see, this dialectical process is working itself out in and through the political life of the Nigerian state, in which the local and national expression of neo-liberalism and Islam are each linked to their respective global counterparts.

Turning to the organization of this paper, after providing a brief overview of Nigeria, we outline our argument concerning the impact of economic globalization and global Islamic movements on the capacity of national states to govern effectively. Our objective is to assess how globalization and Islam impact the capacity of national states to manage Muslim demands for self-determination expressed either as a call for establishing an Islamic state, an alternative Islamic project or greater regional autonomy. After discussing our general arguments, we turn to an analysis of the Sharia movement for self determination in twelve states located in northern Nigeria, a movement that challenged national identities, provoked inter-communal conflict and threatened the existence of the Nigerian federation.
Nigeria under Global Restructuring: A Brief Overview

As Africa’s most populous state (130 million), roughly divided between Muslims and Christians, the Federation of Nigeria is pivotal to the both the global liberal and the global Muslim projects. Once a successful exporter of smaller holder produced tropical commodities, Nigeria is now integrated into the world economy through its total dependence on petroleum exports, much of which flows to the USA. Economically, Nigeria represents a sad tale of venality, chaos and human misery despite extraordinary human and natural resources. To list the causes: total dependence on the distribution of petro-rents, an overextended state whose bloated and technically incompetent bureaucracy (e.g. petrol and electricity supplies) has mismanaged the economy, and a deserved reputation for economic anarchy, lawlessness and social disorder. All of which has destroyed once promising manufacturing sector with an internal market greater than any African or Western European nation-state, and at this stage, eliminated any incentives for disciplined capital accumulation either by Nigeria’s entrepreneurial classes or by foreign investors. Because of intense competition among Nigeria’s 300 ethnic groups for access to state-controlled petroleum rents, the Islamic/Christian division often overlays sharp regional and ethnic divisions, thus sharpening the communal competition for the distribution rents generated by the export of petroleum and natural gas.

Legitimate governance has been fragile since gaining independence in 1960. Yet, to the credit of Nigerian nationalism, despite a civil war, widespread ethnic conflict, brutal military and police actions, and pervasive corruption among a circulating elite, Nigeria has remained united and remarkably optimistic about its future leadership role in Africa. After sixteen years of military rule, only ending with the death of the wantonly brutal dictator, General Sani Abacha, in 1998, Nigeria is now engaged in its third effort to institutionalize liberal democracy under President Obasanjo. No democratically elected government has ever completed a second term without a military coup. While the Third Republic under Obasanjo is widely viewed as corrupt, incompetent, and incapable of managing Nigeria’s economic, security and social problems, it is also noteworthy that salaries are being paid to public servants, civil society groups are thriving, and press and media expression is exuberantly free. It is no mean feat to keep Nigeria together in a region marked by state collapse.

To understand why Sharia is widely popular in the twelve northern states one must compute the accumulated weight of Nigeria’s economic and social problems since the collapse of the petroleum boom in 1981. Space permits only a listing: widespread criminality, police corruption and vigilantism, the breakdown of the administration of justice and public services, political corruption of every imaginable form, declining standards of living coupled with rising educational standards, and a gigantic proportion of the population under the age of 30 (i.e. 72 %). Generational experiences are critical for understanding the discursive shift to Islamism. Today’s much better educated generation now entering their mid-twenties has only experienced economic decline, institutional decay, authoritarianism, and rising poverty especially among the new, urban middle classes. In 1980, when Nigerian petro-revenue reached $24 billion, the per capita income was estimated at $1140; today it is estimated at $ 260 (World Bank, 2002). For 2000, the
UNDP estimates that 70.2 per cent living under $1/day and 90.8 percent live under $2/day.

The trend in poverty rates and the distribution of poverty within Nigeria suggest that the northern Sharia states rank among the poorest with the least access to amenities, health and other government services (Nigeria, FOS, 1999). Table 1 and 2 present estimates of recent poverty trends calculated by the Nigerian Federal Office of Statistics (FOS). From 1980 to 1996, the absolute number in poverty increases from 17.7 million to 67.1 million and the relative proportion of Nigerians in poverty increases from 28.1 percent to 65.6 percent respectively. Tables 3 and 4 are especially valuable because they provide an estimate of the decline of the middle class, a theoretically significant category. The tables show that the non-poor, i.e. the middle and secure working classes, decline from 72.8 percent to 34.4 percent of the population by between 1980 and 1996. Turning to the relative poverty of Sharia states, Table 5 confirms that the incidence of poverty is generally higher in Sharia states than non-Sharia states, reaching 83 percent of the population in the poorest five Sharia states.

Estimates of poverty in the Sharia states are complemented by the excellent analysis of nutrition and health standards by Nigerian Muslim scholars at Ahmadu Bello University (Mohammed, Adamu and Abba, 1999, www.ceddert.com/Article2.htm). To summarize: the occurrence of stunting, wasting, and underweight among infants was higher in the Northeast and Northwest region in 1990, as were other health measures such as potable water; life expectancy, literacy and educational attainment are generally lower in the Sharia states; and access to electricity (i.e. less than 8 percent of households in the northern states) and opportunities for industrial employment are significantly lower in the Sharia states. The paper concludes that “Islamic justice requires that we attack the causes of poor health among our people” and with a quote from revered 18th century reformer, Usman dan Fodio, who wrote “A kingdom can endure with unbelief, but it cannot endure with injustice.”

Recent unilateral declarations of Sharia by 12 of Nigeria’s northern states, effectively constituting a claim to self-determination and religious autonomy, have been associated with rioting, pogroms and the breakdown of pubic order. In the Nigerian case, claims for self-determination and autonomy are multiple and extremely complex. Northern Muslims claim autonomy based upon the Sharia issue. Meanwhile, their ethno-national rivals, the Yoruba (estimated to be half Muslim), are demanding the convening of a sovereign constitutional convention in order to promote their vision of a decentralized and restructured loose confederation. Movements in the oil producing Delta Region demand control over indigenous natural resources, and compensation for the environmental damage caused by petroleum and natural gas extraction. Conflicts between ethnic groups and security forces in this region resulted in the closure of a major proportion of oil production facilities in March 2003. Because of these demands for self-determination and new internal political structures, Nigeria is an ideal case study to challenge any simple theory or empirical generalization regarding the relationship of globalization and self-determination movements. The resolution of self-determination claims and the ability of research to create new mechanisms of governance are critical to the survival of
Overview: Globalization, Islam and Self-Determination Movements

Our primary hypothesis in this paper is that globalization processes disrupt relations between states and political communities, weakening the state’s ability to deliver expected material resources, sustain “national” identities and govern Muslim communities. In various ways, increasing integration into a hyper-competitive world economy, accompanied domestically by liberalization, privatization, and deregulation policies, undermines the capacity of post-colonial state elites to absorb youthful demographic cohorts into the national project. Large, educated and frustrated cohorts of youth made redundant by the intersection of political crisis and decades of liberalization become disillusioned with the failures of their rulers and, for a number of reasons, embrace the alternative discursive political project promised by Islamism. Unless states successfully adjust to globalization, therefore, counter-hegemonic elites mobilize these discontented groups into Islamist social and regional movements that challenge the legitimacy and survival of the post-colonial institutional order. At the same time, however, individual national outcomes vary widely, depending on state cohesion, the capacity to adjust to globalization, regional autonomy, ethnic and class relations and the institutional and cultural content of Islam.

Under the condition of rapid global restructuring and the social disruptions that invariably result, Islamic-inspired movements mobilize transnational, national, and regional networks to support Muslim claims for autonomy, state power, and new international borders. Accordingly, our task is to understand under what conditions these movements thrive and under what conditions states manage to contain them. Most importantly for this project, Islamic movements are not theorized here as simply reactive or binary responses to the penetration of global liberalization. Indeed Muslim transnationalism or globality, in fact, predates the global expansion of Western-origin liberalism. Thus we argue that Islamic institutions, networks and discourses constitute an alternative form of globalization that is both distinct from, yet flourishing opportunistically within, the interstitial spaces created by the new infrastructures defining the new global economic and political system. Framed in this way, we then analyze the capacity of national states like Nigeria to govern Muslim communities under the constraints posed by the tensions exerted by both Islamic and the economic liberal forces of globalization.

Globalization, Sovereignty and Declining State Capacity

Globalization is best understood as a set of interrelated processes that extend, deepen, and speed up the “interconnectedness” of spatial organizations, social relations, and transaction flows (economic, cultural, social) across increasingly porous national borders (Held and McGrew, 1999). Organizationally, globalization promotes flexible economic, social, material, and cultural networks within and around the territorially-embedded, bureaucratic national state. Globalization is embedded as both cause and effect in the rise
of competitive free market policies--often called “neo-liberalism.” Institutions promoting economic globalization demand liberalization of the economy, competitiveness, new export markets, and open capital and currency regimes. They promote “floating” exchange rates, privatization of public industries, deregulation of economic and financial institutions, transnational subcontracting networks for manufacturing and, more generally, the competitive marketization of all material, cultural, and institutional resources.

One frequent result of globalization is the disruption of well-established state, class and coalitional relations of power and authority that, for better or worse, have provided domestic stability and cohesive national identities since the Keynesian era (Lipschutz, 1998). Sadly, state collapse is an increasingly common outcome in Africa. A recent study by the UNDP of major interstate conflicts from 1989-99 concludes that 57 of 61 conflicts began as civil wars and not interstate conflicts (UNDP, 1999). Accordingly, our objective is to analyze the conditions and policies under which national states successfully manage globally linked Muslim social movements. The disruptive processes associated with economic globalization, of course, are mediated within states by many factors: federal constitutions, organizational capacity, export commodity dependence (oil), and ethno-national composition. These factors vary among states and, as a result, the specific outcomes, and success or failures of states, differ from one to the next. At the same time, there are certain parallels among the eight countries on which we focus in this project, in the sense that each has gone through a similar set of historical “phases” that have structured domestic contexts and which continue to affect outcomes. We shall return to this argument, below.

The Impacts of Globalization

Globalization processes impact the national state and Muslim communities in at least three distinct ways:

**Globalization, liberalization and economic change:** Globalization has both enriching and impoverishing impacts, but they are disruptive and usually contribute to domestic instability. On the one hand, globalization is correlated with rising inequality and, in some cases such as Nigeria and Africa in general, with declining real incomes. Economists, of course, debate whether and where incomes declined in real terms during the era of rapid neo-liberal globalization (Watkins, 2002). Whatever rise in real incomes, which occurred mostly in East Asia and parts of Latin America, the period since the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the global economic slowdown since “9-11” have certainly reduced real incomes for the majority of the world.

There is little debate, however, about rising relative income inequality under globalization. According to the UN Development Programme, in 1960 “20% of the world’s people in the richest countries had 50 times the income of the poorest 20%----in 1997, 74 times as much” (UNDP, 1999:36). The polarization of assets and income is startling. The world’s three richest people hold more assets than the combined GDP of a group of less developed countries with a total population of 600 million people (UNDP, 1999:3). The income of the
200 richest people in the world exceeds the combined income of the poorest 2.5 billion people (UNDP, 1999:38). At the same time, the economic opportunities opened up by globalization in countries in transition are also threatening to established structures of power and wealth. The managers of public, parastatal and even private enterprises discover that they no longer have access to state-provided resource flows, a source of rents and patronage to sustain coalitions among economic and political elites.

Structural adjustment policies administered by multi-lateral agencies have produced a surplus of unemployed college graduates, declines in employment in privatized state industries, and deep generational differences. In states struggling to adjust, globalization has created an abundant pool of recruits for mobilization into militant Islamic movements seeking group rights, Sharia law, or alternations in the existing borders. When entire labor forces are thrown out of work, managers and elites are in a position to scapegoat specific marginalized ethnic or religious groups. State withdrawal from provisioning services creates opportunities for surplus graduates to create an Islamic alternative sector, or to invest in promoting Islamist political and social programs such as “Shariaization”. While this new domestic "division of accumulation" creates opportunities for recent secondary and tertiary graduates to build the Islamic alternative, it also leads to struggles that play out in the political realm.

**Globalization and state authority:** For national states to sustain political coalitions and legitimacy, and to fix meaningful national identities, élites must manage economic growth and extend social services (education, health, consumer subsidies). Global market forces and multilateral regulatory institutions (IMF, World Bank, WTO) compel states to restructure the ways in which they make and implement economic policy decisions, allocate resources among different sectors of society, and regulate a broad range of domestic activities. It reduces the availability of material resources that states and communal and religious élites were formerly able to distribute to their clients as a means of maintaining social cohesion and political stability. Consequently, as responsibilities are shed or transferred and material resources dry up, globalization undermines the national state’s ability to manage the domestic economy, bind contentious ethno-national groups into coalitions, co-opt rival leaders, absorb new generations, mobilize citizens to affirm their national identity, and to effectively regulate harmonious and stable relations among competing and diverse groups. Under the conditions associated with globalization, the domestic social structures of any given state—the source of political stability—can rapidly lose their cohesion, calling into question the very foundations of a state’s constitutional existence (Crawford, 1998; Lipschutz, 1998).

**Globalization, information networks, and identities:** Globalization affects the capacity of bureaucratic élites to manage the cultural capital that define cohesive national identities by simultaneously diluting state authority, state presence and, more importantly, exposing the populace to competing cultural identities now visible through new global communications and media (Appadurai, 1996). The new information technologies, together with cheap travel and other global infrastructures, facilitate the resurgence of Muslim globality, an identity never erased entirely by the forces of post-colonial nationalism. Aspirations for the restoration of Sharia reflect both a claim for
“self-determination”, and an imagining of membership in a global ummah are now facilitated by the electronic imagery associated with globalization. Burke coins the valuable term, a discursive shift to Islam, to capture this aspect of Muslim globalization (Burke, 1997).

National identities are also challenged by increased flows of pilgrims, students, scholars and labor flowing through the new global infrastructures. All of which increases the interconnectedness of Muslims and increases the social and cultural influences of Muslim diasporic communities on the consciousness, identity and resources of mobilized Muslim groups within a national state (Lubeck, 2000). The same technologies also connect locally-bounded citizens to globally dispersed members of highly-networked diasporas. Using new communications technologies to bridge long distances, political elites living in diasporic communities can easily communicate daily with constituents, helping to sustain oppositional Muslim movements. Al-Qaeda’s strategy, for example, is inconceivable without the Internet and the global communications system. It is, in practice, a decentralized Castellian network rooted in the “space of flows” not the space of place; Islamism is embedded within the interstices of the global system, one that adeptly uses the American sponsored global information, communication and transportation system to wage war against the hegemonic powers (Castells, 2000).

We should note that “global communication” is nothing new in the Muslim world. Historically, Muslim states, communities, and movements have always defined themselves as universal in terms of recruitment, global in spatial form, and transnational in terms of networks. Ironically, despite the contemporary Islamist demand for centralized, authoritarian Islamic states—a wholly modernist invention—the distinguishing feature of Muslim civilization has been the conferring on individuals of common status and privileges based upon membership in a transnational political community of believers, the ummah, regardless of one’s original birthplace (Hodgeson, 1974; Lapidus, 1988). Transnational networking, moreover, has been enhanced by the Muslim obligation to undertake, during one’s lifetime, a pilgrimage (hajj) to shrines in Arabia. Admission to the shrines as a pilgrim, in actual practice, defines who is a valid Muslim. Pilgrimage authorities, including non-Saudis, enforce Muslim boundaries for the entire Muslim world. Together, travel, Islamic scholarship, long distance trade, and pilgrimage obligations have combined to etch a web of networks composed of Muslim communities across Europe, Asia, Africa, and increasingly, the Americas. Contemporary globalization processes have, therefore, fused two intertwined yet distinct kinds of globalization, the historically Muslim and the contemporary global capitalist systems.

In other words, national states, whose authority is constrained by liberalization of finance, telecommunications, and other tools of economic sovereignty find themselves besieged not only from within but also from without. They are engaged in growing struggles to manage the aspirations for greater autonomy and political power voiced by Muslim activists residing within their territories. Yet, oppositional leverage is bolstered, as well, by the wealth, networks, informational capacity and cultural power of globalized diasporic communities operating without, in the EU, the United States, other Muslim majority states and the large global ummah.
The National Context

We hypothesize that these three dimensions of globalization challenge the capacity of national states to manage Muslim activists while, at the same time, providing support for Muslim activists seeking domestic and international support for self-determination, group rights, regional autonomy and even changes in international borders. As intervening variables, variations in state organizational capacity, constitutional structures, and ethno-national composition mediate the impact of these three dimensions of globalization on Muslim political activity. We further hypothesize that states that successfully adjust their economic and political strategies to the liberalizing global economy will be more successful in asserting their legitimacy, thus containing and rationalizing Muslim demands for autonomy, group rights, and Muslim law. Finally, our research seeks to identify and explain the effects that specific dimensions of globalization have on state capacity and the mobilization of Muslim movements and, further, to identify within states those institutions and practices that explain variations in states' ability to cope with revitalized Muslim movements.

In the following outline we suggest in a preliminary way how globalization processes have differentially impacted upon the eight states of interest. We are interested in understanding the institutional and cultural conditions that allowed some states to adjust far better than others. In addition we are concerned with how global Islamic networks, institutions and discourses are internalized in different ways in each national state.

Globalization and State Capacity: Understanding Historical Sequences

Phase 1: The colonial legacy (pre-independence): With the exception of Turkey which emerged after World War I from the Ottoman Empire, seven of the eight countries went through a colonial period. Both Egypt and Turkey achieved “independence” after World War I; the other six between 1948 and 1960. This period is critical in setting in place both domestic governmental systems and class and ethnic structures. The latter was often structured either through systems of indirect rule, which carried over into the post-independence period and may continue to exist, even today, or by the privileging of certain groups over others in order to create collaborating élites for the colonial and post-colonial projects.

Phase 2: National state-building (independence to 1967/1970): All eight of our cases went through periods, after independence, in which governing élites sought to put in place state-building projects. The designers of these projects sought to establish state legitimacy, both nationally and internationally, by creating autonomous, industrialized economies as well as cohesive national identities. The European nation-state was the model to be emulated, although the particular forms varied. Thus, Kemal Attaturk tried to reproduce the secular, liberal state in Turkey, with some success, while Gamel Abdul Nasser and Algeria attempted to implement “Arab Socialism,” which tried to fuse nationalism, populism and state economic intervention into a developmental model. Others like Nigeria, Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan combined rule by precolonial
elites, emerging middle classes and military officers in market economies. In the long
run, however, all of the eight were too dependent on external financing and investment to
go it alone, so the state-building projects could not be sustained without adjusting to the
new winds of globalization. It is noteworthy that the Arab defeat, widely perceived in the
Muslim world as a Muslim defeat, in the Six Day War (1967) occurred at the same time
as the crisis of state-centered import substitution and just prior to the OPEC price
revolution.

price revolution destabilized the economies of oil importers, oil exporters and suppliers
of labor, services and goods to the Gulf States. For those blessed with oil, the enormous
increases in national incomes provided funds for all kinds of social subsidies, including
much larger secondary and post-secondary enrollments. These monies also distorted
domestic prices and labor supplies in critical sectors (such as agriculture), and helped to
institutionalize political economies of corruption and rent seeking. Petroleum revenues
thus created much more extensive and greedy rentier political elites, who presided over
autonomous state-centered economies but were largely uninterested in productive social
structures of accumulation. Unimpeded by market discipline, the power of disciplined
accumulating classes and the fiscal constraints normally demanded by taxpayers, the
results were nothing short of disastrous (Karl, 1997).

Such distortions had impacts even those countries with little or no oil resources, such as
Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan. These were affected through their reliance on oil
transshipment incomes, export good markets, labor remittances from workers in oil-rich
countries, and foreign assistance provided to them as "strategic partners" in defense of
Western geopolitical interests. Ironically, the petro-dollar surpluses accumulated in the
most conservative Gulf states, who then institutionalized global networks promoting the
most illiberal and authoritarian interpretations of Islamic practice.

Phase 4: Globalization, liberalization, and structural adjustment: As oil revenues
dried up in the early 1980s and neo-liberal structural adjustment policies were
implemented globally, domestic social subsidies for food, education, and health were
reduced (even as corruption continued). Over time, infrastructure crumbled, and external
pressures grew to liberalize as a means of opening up economies to diversification,
foreign investment, and the universalized promises represented by export-led growth.
Prior policies encouraging secondary and post-secondary education and the privatization
of labor-absorbing state industries created a frustrated reservoir of disappointed middle
class recruits for Islamic movements as well as impoverishment and unemployment,
which have acted as push factors behind flows of emigrants from some countries through
diasporic networks into Europe. At the same time, Islamic networks have provided
alternative social organization via communications, movement, and institutions. These
Islamic networks are put in place by social movements, domestic and transnational,
which also offer a “parallel polis”, redistribution mechanisms, and the possibilities for
action by those who oppose the regimes in place.
In some instances, as in the states of northern Nigeria and parts of Indonesia, liberalization under the boom and bust of the petro-economy has been catastrophic, with Muslims and Christians at each other's throats. In other cases, as in Turkey, Malaysia and India, liberalization has provided opportunities for an emerging and vocal Muslim middle-class, one not necessarily welcomed by the political and economic elites in the former cases, or the Hindu majority in the latter. Malaysia, Turkey and, before the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia adjusted far better than others to economic globalization. By 2000, however, the positive economic growth generated by global liberalization had stagnated and the Washington Consensus sustaining the project was shattered by recrimination and popular movements (Stiglitz, 2002).

**Phase 5: Empire and Islamic Assertion (2001- ???):** The September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, DC mark a new phase whose precise form and outcome cannot be easily, nor wholly predicted. The American response in Afghanistan and the Anglo-American war on Iraq have destroyed the strategic coalitions upon which liberal global governance was constructed at the end of World War II. Throughout the Cold War and the 1990s, the American desire to protect its access to oil resources led not only to support for authoritarian and pseudo-democratic regimes but also the suppression of left-nationalist groups and parties throughout the Islamic world, oftentimes by cynically supporting Islamic social movements against the latter. Consequently, in most situations, Islamic movements became the only channels through which political dissatisfaction and dissent might be expressed both because of the vitality of these movements and the support they received from the authoritarian elites backed by Washington. “Blowback” haunts the psyche of American strategic planners as never before (Johnson, 2000).

Today, even moderate Muslims are having serious doubts about the American project to democratize the Muslim world by force and the legitimacy of America’s client regimes. It is not out of the realm of possibility that one result of the invasion of Iraq and its aftermath will be their collapse and replacement by Islamic governments.

With the sequential schema in mind, we now turn to analyzing the rise of the Sharia movement in Nigeria from its pre-colonial origins to the present phase.

**Contextualizing the History of Sharia Movements in the Northern States of Nigeria**

In April 2001 the Nigeria Muslim Forum (UK) sponsored an international conference in London entitled “The Restoration of Shariah in Nigeria- The Benefits and Challenges” (www.shariah2001.nmnonline.net). Discursively understood, by accenting the restoration of Sharia back to Muslim Nigerians, the organizers tried to position their project within the anti-imperialist, nationalist discourse of Islam, and in opposition to the discredited secular nationalist legal system introduced by British imperialism. We have no doubt that the restoration of Sharia criminal law is widely popular and that it would win by a landslide if put to the vote. Whatever their private chagrin and misgivings, few if any critical intellectuals identified with human rights and progressive politics have publicly opposed the idea of restoring Sharia criminal law. Instead, their criticism focuses on the interpretation of Sharia, the ignorance of the judges and vigilante police (hizbah), the outrageous gender bias in its enforcement, the interests of the poor, the lack
of preparation, and the absence of codified law. Many share S. L. Sanusi’s suspicions regarding “the method and timing of its implementation”, because the governor of Zamfere state introduced Sharia in the criminal code several months after the displacement of the northern Muslim oligarchy from the presidency (Sanusi, 2001, www.gamji.com/sanusi30htm). Let us review the history of Sharia in Nigeria.

Islam was introduced into the northeast states of the northern region as early as the 11th century by North African traders and scholars involved in the trans-Saharan gold trade. Gradually, rulers converted to Islam and Muslim scholars institutionalized Muslim law, literature and Muslim institutions as part of a strategy to construct a centralized, urban, bureaucratic state apparatuses over the lineage-based societies in the countryside. The process was not linear. Tensions arose between Muslims associated with long distance trade, urbanity and Muslim legal scholarship and leaders of indigenous communities associated with lineage-based agrarian practices (i.e. sacred groves, land priests, ritual and fertility rites expected from rulers), pre-Islamic beliefs and customary practices. Authors of Muslim manuscripts record periods of Muslim reform followed by periods of regression to traditional and syncretic practices. Over the longer term, however, the discursive power of Islam and the institutions of a Muslim mercantile economy gradually became embedded in the cultural practices of the diverse societies in what are now the Sharia states of northern Nigeria.

In the later decades of the 18th century, the region was transformed by a revolutionary reform movement led by Usman dan Fodio, a charismatic Muslim scholar influenced by the Islamic revival centered in Mecca and Medina. The “Shehu” (shayk) began preaching against the “backsliding” rulers of the Hausa-speaking city states accusing them of injustices, corruption, illegal taxation, tolerating un-Islamic practices and repression of what Hodgeson calls “Sharia-minded” Muslims (Hodgson, 19XX). By the middle of the 19th century Fodio, his brother Abdullahi and his son Mohammed Bello had constructed a geographically vast and multi-ethnic Muslim empire ---the Sokoto Caliphate--- extending across northern Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon and even into Yoruba-speaking regions of Illorin. The Caliphate ranks as one of largest and most complexly organized pre-colonial African states, one that was recognized in the wider Muslim world. Organizationally, the Caliphate was ruled by a highly differentiated Muslim ruling class of prebendal officeholders, and a community of Muslim scholars that together extended the spatial boundaries of Islam and the cultural depth of Islamic practice. Meanwhile, the relative peace and expansion of trade also extended the security and intellectual reach of Muslim scholarly and trading networks---the ulama--- who formed a powerful status honor group whose support was required to legitimate the taxation and governing practices of the Muslim officeholders.

Islamic law provided the cultural cohesion that enabled the rulers and ulama to administer one of Africa’s most extensive and complexly organized agrarian bureaucratic empires. The Caliphate was urbanized, highly commercialized, peopled by a free and slave-origin peasantry and administered by literate bureaucrats. It’s indigo cotton and leather handicraft manufactures were traded across West and North Africa. With the exception of Borno, therefore, the Caliphate unified tens of Muslim emirates under
Sharia, a population numbering a million or more people from Niger to Cameroon. While emirates like Kano may have rebelled and sectarian differences arose among believers, the territorial, economic and cultural integrity of the Caliphate under Sharia law remained intact until the British conquest in 1903.

Drawing upon their practices in India, British colonial policy institutionalized “indirect rule” by rationalizing the practices of the pre-existing Muslim administrators at the lowest cost to the imperial treasury. To summarize: slave raiding and trading were abolished but not slavery; higher taxes, forced labor and other forms of domination by the ruling class over the commoners were buttressed by the technical power of the British empire; Muslim district heads were placed over non-Muslim subjects and Christian missionarises banned from proselytizing in Muslim areas; traditional juridical checks on autocratic power were eroded; and most importantly, Islamic law was institutionalized and rationalized throughout the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria usually by borrowing from British legal institutions already established in Sudan and Egypt. According to the authoritative view of Anderson:

[T]he case of Northern Nigeria was, indeed, almost unique, for up till [1960] this was the only place outside the Arabian Peninsula in which the Islamic law, both substantive and procedural, was applied in criminal litigation—sometimes even in regard to capital offences... (Anderson, 1976).

In practice, this meant that the British suspended punishments like stoning for adultery and amputation for theft, but sustained a Sharia-based civil and criminal code and a court system under the authoritarian rule of emirs and their clients. Ironically, for the commoners, Islamic social movements, educational institutions and cultural practices thrived under the improved security, transportation infrastructure and commercial protection afforded by British rule. During the final decades of colonial rule, however, a popular Islamic revival led by sufi brotherhoods appeared among urban-based Muslim scholars and the commercial classes of merchants and craftsmen, transforming the areas of education, female seclusion, mysticism, pilgrimage and public piety. Organizationally, the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya brotherhoods spearheaded this movement and extended their network of scholars, schools and mosques throughout the colonial transportation infrastructure and throughout the commercial and cultural networks of West Africa.

Global Discourses of Rationality: “Religion and the Decline of Magic” Redux

“In all these different ways the Protestant Reformers rejected the magical powers and the supernatural sanctions which had been so plentifully invoked by the Medieval Church. In Protestant mythology the Middle Ages became notorious as the time of darkness, when spells and charms had masqueraded as religion and when the lead in magical activity had been taken by the clergy themselves” (Thomas, 1971, 68)
To grasp the Sharia movement as a self-determination movement, one must understand the practices of the Sufi brotherhoods and the conflict their practices incited among the contemporary Salafi-inspired Islamist movements, which, in northern Nigeria are associated with greater global integration into the new global discourses. Salafi reform movements are directly linked to the discourses and networks of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and reformers influenced by Saudi Wahabbi movements. The intense discursive struggles involved violence, mass movements and declarations of apostasy (takfir) especially against the Sufi brotherhood leaders. For this reason, Salafi attacks on Sufi and popular religious practices are analogous to the Protestant Reformers described in Keith Thomas’ classic study.

The charismatic leaders who founded brotherhoods claim to have a mystical insight into the experience of the divine, oftentimes realized through a dream or supernatural experience. Once members are initiated into the brotherhood’s ritual practices by leaders (muqaddams), their lineage of initiation is ranked according to proximity to the brotherhood founder or the Prophet and multiple lineages are eagerly sought by brotherhood members. In practice, membership in a brotherhood like the Tijaniyya or Qadiriyya involves gnostic knowledge, secret prayers, chants, trances, drumming and claims of special mediation through to their founder to Allah or the Prophet. Because the Salafi reformers accept only the Qur’ān, the Sunnah (authenticated Prophet statements and behavior) and the legitimacy of the four rightly guided Caliphs succeeding Mohammed, they reject as innovations all of the ritual trappings and gnostic claims of Sufi brotherhoods. Specifically, Salafi’s reject “intermediaries” between individuals and Allah including efforts to project sainthood onto Mohammed, the mystical insights claimed by charismatic Sufis, veneration of the saints anniversaries or their tombs, or any suggestion that charms, relics, waters, or other forms of magic contain sacred power. Finally, Sufi brotherhood leaders were attacked for tolerating a popular industry of itinerant, uneducated ulama (mallams) who earned a living making charms, amulets or writing verses on wooden slates which are then washed off and consumed as a religious potion, (rubutun sha).

Initiation networks of brotherhoods proved to be highly valued networks for merchants and Muslim scholars under colonial rule when few had access to formal political institutions or courts. Most importantly, the initiate accumulates grace (baraka) through the ritual inter-mediation of his shaykh and not through the individual’s Islamic knowledge and/or direct communication with God. While Sufi brotherhood leaders claim distinct gnostic insights only available to followers through rituals, they may also claimed association with prodigious Islamic scholars and writers like Usman dan Fodio who was an initiate of the Qadiriyya. Lastly, when the independence movement emerged in Muslim northern Nigeria during the 1950s, contending politicians attempted to mobilize brotherhood networks, symbols and resources so as to gain political advantage over their rivals.
Globalization and the Sharia Movement Revival in Nigeria

Faced with economic decline, ruthless authoritarian rulers, endemic corruption and widespread personal and social insecurity, young Nigerians have become disillusioned with the post-colonial state. Not surprisingly, all sections of society have turned to religion for solace, solidarity and alternatives. Both Christian and Muslim revivalists are inspired by and closely linked to globalized networks for new ideas, material support and new strategies of conversion. At the same time, religious authority, both Christian and Muslim, has become increasingly fragmented with new globally linked activists appearing to challenge existing hierarchies of power.

Fragmentation of authority and globally linked Islamic movements lie at the heart of the Sharia movement. Among Muslims in the northern states, the Izala, or the Society for the Eradication of Innovation and the Establishment of the Sunna, constitute the most influential revival movement since the onset of globalization and the petro-boom bust cycle. Their name derives from a treatise written by Usman dan Fodio so they seek to represent themselves as successors to the reformers who established the Sokoto Caliphate. The inspiration for Izala and the power behind the movement was Abubakar Gummi (died 1992), an Arabic teacher, former Grand Kadi of Northern Nigeria and principal beneficiary of Saudi and Gulf state patronage in Nigeria. Because of his close links since the 1950s with the Saudis as Nigeria’s pilgrim agent, his critics label him a Wahabbi and a tool of the Saudis. But this characterization as we shall see is too partisan for his scholarship and pragmatic policies reflect greater vision, much broader affiliations with the world Islamist movements as well as the influence of revolutionary writers such as Sayyid Qutb from the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt.

Under Gumi’s powerful intellectual and financial direction, the Izala was founded in 1978 in opposition to the practices and beliefs of the Tijaniyya and, to a lesser degree, the Qadiriyya brotherhoods. In step with Wahabbi and Islamist reformers in the Muslim world, Gumi declared the practices of Sufi brotherhoods to be innovations that lacked roots in the Qur’an or the practices (Sunna) of the Prophet and his immediate companions (Salafi). Instead, the Izala exhorted the faithful to accept no intermediaries between themselves and God, to reject Sufi mysticism as innovative superstition, to refuse to tolerate popular forms of magic in the form of potion and charms and to take responsibility as individuals to become learned in Islamic knowledge. Most importantly, the Izala castigated the brotherhoods for excessive hierarchy and for failing to educate women in Islamic studies. Soon the Izala established gender segregated classes for women and support for women’s Islamic organizations like FOMWAN, the Federation of Muslim Women’s Organizations of Nigeria. In addition, the Izala appealed to newly educated youth whose aspirations for material security were threatened by attacking excessive brideprice and marriage payments.

Labeling the Izala as fundamentalist distorts the global and modernist dimensions of their program. To summarize: the Izala’s emphasis on individual responsibility, their embracing of the ethic equality before God without mystical intermediaries, the rejection of superstition, the advocacy of women’s education and social participation, and the
support for the grievances of younger Muslims seeking to form families suggests the rationalization if not the modernization of religion is in a way analogous to that of Protestant reformers. For this reason, unlike the brotherhoods whose support depended upon established merchant classes, the Izala’s support was drawn mainly from modern secondary school and university graduates, educated women, civil servants and communities located outside of the main commercial centers (Loimeier, 1997). Besides their shared material deprivation as salaried workers, these groups also possessed the educational capital to instruct themselves in Islamic law and to keep abreast of intellectual issues debated within the wider global networks that increasingly integrated the world’s Muslim community.

**Sharia as a Globally Networked Self-Determination Movement**

The Sharia movement in the 12 northern states is popularly legitimated and would win if put on the ballot. On one hand, it arises from the consequences of economic globalization and the crisis of the post-colonial state. On the other hand, the Sharia movement is promoted by groups like the Izala with strong linkages to the global Islamic networks operating within Nigeria. Let us review the reasons why Sharia is popular and why Sharia is unlikely to result in the separation of the northern states from the Federation of Nigeria.

Demands for Sharia have been on the political agenda in one form or another since the Constitutional Assembly debates of 1976-77. It is also represents the northern Muslim response to the demands of southern groups for greater regional autonomy. Lewis’ survey data shows that two thirds of Muslims from the northern states and 38% of Muslims from southern states favor increasing Sharia. Scholars such as Murray Last believe that, since states retain all powers not formally allocated to the federal government, subnational states possess the right to implement Sharia law at the criminal level and to create police and courts to enforce Sharia. Others insist the federal government will never permit cruel punishments like the stoning of alleged adulterers who are usually powerless, uneducated women. No decision has been made by federal courts and no one has been stoned to death yet.

Sharia advocates argue that not only has Sharia been the basis of civil and personal law among consenting Muslims since independence, but that the Nigerian criminal law is derived in large part from Sharia. Islamists appeal to populist, anti-imperialist sentiments when they argue that the post-colonial secular state was imposed upon Nigeria by colonial powers regardless of the will of the large Muslim minority. Additional arguments focus on the failure of the Nigerian court system to function effectively, the corruption of judges, the lack of a speedy trial often resulting in periods of incarceration while awaiting trial exceeding the normal sentence if convicted and the widespread knowledge of the principles of Muslim law and jurisprudence (fiqh) in the general population.

It is readily apparent that the Sharia movement is a regional expression of the global identity movement intrinsically linked to the world wide Islamic revival. To be sure,
Sharia arises because of Nigeria’s mismanaged dependence on petro-rents and the failure of the post-colonial state to manage the national economy. The widespread breakdown of law and order, the arbitrary violence and criminality of the police and security forces and the disillusionment with the post-colonial secular state fuel the popular movement. Among the impoverished and insecure in northern Nigeria whose malnutrition and poverty is amply documented, Sharia promises a popularly legitimated blueprint for a just and secure moral order. These groups expect, and to some degree have received in the Zamfara State, access to foodstuffs that Sharia requires be collected from the wealthy, i.e. Zakat, and distributed to impoverished members of the Muslim community.

We conclude with the question of whether the Sharia movement will move from autonomy to the breakup of the Nigerian federation. This outcome is very unlikely and virtually impossible to imagine as a policy pursued by the elites of the northern region. Why? To date, all sources of petroleum and natural gas exports are located in the southern states, mostly on the lands of small ethnic groups and increasingly in offshore zones. Secession by the northern states will be economic suicide because of Nigeria’s complete dependence on energy exports to finance the domestic economy. In the last instance, therefore, the structural bonds linking Nigeria to the global economy effectively eliminate the independence option for even the most ardent advocates of Sharia. In lieu of independence, however, the Sharia movement has unified, to some degree, the badly fragmented solidarity among northern Muslims, a solidarity that they require in order to claim their share political power and, of course, petro-rents.
## Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Poverty Level</th>
<th>Estimated Total Population</th>
<th>Number of Nigerians in Poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>65.0 million</td>
<td>17.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
<td>75.0 million</td>
<td>34.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
<td>91.5 million</td>
<td>39.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>65.6%</td>
<td>102.3 million</td>
<td>67.1 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


## Table 2

**Absolute Number of Nigerians in Poverty* 1980-1996**

*The poverty line in Nigeria is defined as any household living at or below two thirds of the mean per capita expenditure on a fixed basket of food and non-food items.*
Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Non-poor (%)</th>
<th>Moderately poor (%)</th>
<th>Core poor (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Non-poor (%)</th>
<th>Moderately poor (%)</th>
<th>Core poor (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proxy for estimating poverty rate: **Total Real per Capita Expenditure**

**Classes:**
- **Non-poor (NP)**: above 2/3 of the mean per capita expenditure in Nigeria
- **Moderately poor (MP)**: between 1/3 and 2/3 of the mean per capita expenditure in Nigeria
- **Core poor (CP)**: 1/3 of the mean per capita expenditure in Nigeria or below
### Table 5

Incidence of Poverty (%) by Sharia/non-Sharia States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anambra/Enugu</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi/Gombe</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>83.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edo/Delta</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno/Yobe</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>66.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross River/Akwa Ibom</td>
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<td>41.9</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>66.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>47.2</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>65.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imo/Abia</td>
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<td>33.1</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>44.7</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano/Jigawa</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>71.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kwara/Kogi</td>
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<td>39.3</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>75.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogun</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ondo</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>71.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oyo/Oshun</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>58.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
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<td>44.4</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto/Kebbi/Zamfara</td>
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<td>45.8</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>83.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL NIGERIA</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharia States</td>
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<td>56.5</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>70.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>non-Sharia States</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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