Policy Brief

Understanding the complex causes and processes of radicalisation
BACKGROUND

In both public discourse and the academic literature, the crucial distinctions between violent and non-violent radicalisation are not sufficiently and consciously appreciated always. Similarly, the processes and causes of radicalisation have remained controversial.

A widespread view is that economic factors, particularly poverty and inequality, are the driving causes of radicalisation; political manipulation is often considered as a contributing factor. Occasionally, social, religious, cultural and historical factors are also mentioned. But empirical research reveals that the causes, processes and types of radicalisation are quite complex, defying any simplistic single-factor explanation.

Conceptual clarity, including precise definition of key concepts, is the critical first step toward sophisticated understanding of the phenomenon. Radicalisation means the process leading to radicalism: an extreme shift in attitudes, beliefs and practices that depart significantly from the mainstream in society. As a process, radicalisation is necessarily dynamic because it depends on contexts and perspectives. What counts as radical in one context may become quite normal in another context.

In many cases, radicalisation has to overcome counter-radicalisation in the form of actors, forces and conditions in society that inhibit its growth and spread. In contrast, disengagement from radicalism is the withdrawal from radical action and renunciation of affiliation to radical movements while still maintaining radical views and attitudes. Deradicalisation entails renouncing radical action, views, attitudes, and affiliation to radical movements as well.

Even though radicalisation may lead to violence, this is not always the case; hence, it is important to understand how and why radicalisation may remain non-violent or end up in violence. It is also imperative to note that not all violent radicals resort to terrorism—the deliberate targeting of the innocent in order to cause widespread fear and apprehension.

CAUSES OF RADICALISATION ARE COMPLEX

The many causes of radicalisation include economic, social, political, psychological, historical and ideological conditions that provide both the context and the driving forces that lead individuals and groups to become radicalized. The complexities of social causation makes it difficult to identify the precise ways and mechanisms that connect the various causes of radicalisation to their outcomes. Despite the daunting challenges, accurate understanding of the causes of radicalisation is indispensable for crafting appropriate policies and effective strategies of intervention. Treating the underlying causes of a problem is more effective than dealing with the symptoms.

Several approaches to understanding the causes of radicalisation can be identified in the academic literature.

One approach emphasizes the varieties of the causes of radicalisation by demonstrating that the preconditions that set the stage are not the same as the permissive factors that enable and motivate actors, and provide opportunities for radicalisation. The various causes of radicalisation operate at different levels of causation. For example, structural causes “affect people’s lives in ways that they may or may not comprehend.” Facilitator causes make radicalisation “possible or attractive, without being prime movers.”
Motivational causes are the “actual grievances that people experience at a personal level, motivating them” to become radicalized. Finally, triggering causes take the form of “momentous or provocative events, a political calamity, an outrageous act committed by the enemy, or some other events that call for revenge or action.”

Depending on the different causes, several typologies distinguish different types of radicalisation, including religious vs. secular, ethnic vs. political, individual vs. group, violent vs. non-violent, home-grown vs. foreign etc. Other typologies are based on the motivations of the radicalized individuals such as revenge, thrill-seeking, status affirmation, quest for meaning, identity, justice, fame, etc. Individuals play different roles as leader, ideologue, organizer, foot-soldier, recruiter, financier, etc.

Another approach to understanding radicalisation focuses on the risk factors that push or pull individuals and groups towards radicalisation. Push risk-factors include emotional vulnerability such as anger, alienation, and disenfranchisement. Individuals could be pushed into radicalisation by their perception of the failure of all nonviolent alternatives, including political participation, civil society action, peaceful protest etc. Another push factor is the identification with victims of injustice, political repression, religious persecution, cultural discrimination, and economic deprivation. Pull risk factors include the rewards for joining a radical group in the form of material gains, sense of belonging to a “moral” or “religious” group, support and camaraderie from fellow radicals. Whether drawn by pull or push factors, individuals follow specific pathways of radicalisation. A notable pathway is the “slippery slope” that gradually leads to radicalisation through social ties with friends and family members who are already radicalized. Once drawn into a radical group, the new-comer is radicalized further via group dynamics, including shift to extreme views among like-minded individuals, extreme cohesion under isolation and threat, and competition for the same base of support that leads to a spiraling of radicalisation in a sort of bidding war. Fictionalization, a common group dynamic, could also result in more extreme radicalisation.

An insightful approach to comprehending radicalisation highlights its evolutionary nature and the filtering that occurs as the push and pull factors exert greater and greater influence on individuals, and group dynamics escalate radicalisation towards violence. Moghaddam employs the metaphor of “staircase to terrorism” to capture the incremental features and the filtering mechanisms of radicalisation leading to violence. On the ground floor, millions of people “perceive injustice and feel relatively deprived,” but most people will do nothing about it, while some individuals out of the millions of “the disgruntled population will climb to the first floor in search of solutions.” On the first floor, individuals search for solutions to their adverse conditions. Continuing frustration at this level can push some individuals up to the second floor where their grievances may still not be solved, thereby leading to more anger and frustration, and hence becoming more receptive to being “influenced by leaders to displace their aggression onto an enemy.” Fewer individuals who are more likely to displace physical aggression onto the “enemy” will climb up

the stairs to the third floor, where “a gradual engagement with the morality of terrorist organizations” transforms some individuals to begin “to see terrorism as a justified strategy.” On the fourth floor, the individuals are recruited into terrorist organizations and are further transformed to accept categorization of “the world more rigidly into ‘us-versus-them’ and to see the terrorist organization as legitimate.” All is now set for some individuals to step up the stairs to the fifth and final floor, where “specific individuals are selected and trained to sidestep inhibitory mechanisms that could prevent them from injuring and killing both others and themselves, and those selected are equipped and sent to carry out terrorist acts.”

Without worrying about the academic subtleties and nuances of the various approaches, useful insights can be drawn from each. Analysis of risk factors that push or pull individuals and groups in different pathways suggests that radicalisation should be understood not as a discreet one-time event, but as a series of events that evolve incrementally through different stages. The complex model of causation highlighting several causes operating at different levels indicates the imperative to avoid the simplistic attribution of radicalisation to one and only cause, such as economic, political, religious or other causes. Incremental escalation requires careful attention to the various issues, factors and motives that are salient at different stages. Policy interventions will be more effective if crafted appropriately and targeted specifically at particular causes, risk factors, levels and types of radicalisation, as well as the profiles and motivations of the radicalized individual or group.

CASE-STUDIES REVEAL THE COMPLEXITIES OF RADICALISATION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

This brief draws from three empirical case-studies that examine the complexities of the causes and processes of radicalisation in northern Nigeria. Their key findings are consistent with the major thrust of the relevant academic literature. The three case-studies investigated 1) childhood experiences and youth radicalisation 2) radicalisation of almajirai, and 3), gender dimensions of radicalisation.

Childhood and Youth Radicalisation

The case-study on childhood experiences and youth radicalisation is based primarily on extended ethnographic field research in a Hausa farmstead in the 1970s-1980s, and on fieldwork in the 1990s on youth in metropolitan Kano. The case-study searches within children’s experiences of growing up for any possible indicators and processes that might lead an individual to later radicalisation.


Among the major findings are:

- The key elements in the experiences of northern Nigerian childhood include a deep sense of justice (adalci) and respect (girma; mutunci). Both parents and peers inculcate the notion that endurance, toughness, patience and self-restraint are worthy values that children should cultivate. Children are not usually beaten even if they behaved badly: other children’s long-term disapproval and ridicule (ba’a) and shame (kunya) could be enough punishment for misbehaviour.

- In the countryside, where police are absent, young boys are expected to defend their environment, whether against armed robbers or dangerously armed people: as a group they are ready to kill the intruder. Violence is the domain of the young; elders use their brains, not their bodies, to reprimand their subordinates.

- Migration from rural to urban areas is a key experience that could lead to radicalisation. In this context, a father’s injustice becomes particularly unforgivable, and can lead to a son’s very angry withdrawal to a big city where he needs not only shelter and food but also companionship.

- A migrant youth in urban areas might join criminal and semi-criminal gangs, but could also follow any one of the several radical Islamic preachers who have gathered disciples within the big cities.

- Parental ‘neglect’ is not a salient feature in youth radicalisation. More significant are the new youth sub-cultures that have been developing within the great cities.

- The size and density of today’s cities make it impossible for the local authorities to carry out the old-style surveillance against religious or political subversives. Until the 1970s, radical Islamic groupings located themselves far out on the edges of emirates where central governments could ignore them. But similarly extreme and vigorously proselytising sects have now set up, as never before, within urban areas where they clash with police and other established authorities.

- The emerging radical Islamic groups thus become a focus for those with both a quest for radical reform and a readiness to assert the truth of their ideals through violence on others.

Almajirai and Radicalisation

Almajirai is the Hausa term for pupils who attend traditional Qur’anic schools (tsangaya) in Northern Nigeria, and depend on charity and street begging for their survival. Almajirai are commonly seen as the default recruitment pool for any number of deviant gangs, perpetrators of ethno-religious conflict, and most recently the JAS insurgency. In contrast to the common perception of almajirai as potential recruits into radicalisation, the findings from the case study on the almajirai reveal that the fundamental ethos of Qur’anic education, especially the centrality of obedience to authorities, inhibits the radicalisation of almajirai. But recent changes within the system are increasingly making the almajirai vulnerable to many temptations, including radicalisation.

The case-study on almajirai was conducted through ethnographic research, using in-depth interviews to collect primary data in five states (Jigawa, Borno, Kano, Katsina and Zamfara). A sample 37 interviewees was drawn from a population of 370 Islamic Scholars and Opinion Leaders, including teachers and proprietors of Qur’anic schools. 80 almajirai were selected and interviewed. Some of the interviewees reside in urban settings while others are located...
in peri-urban and rural areas. The almajirai interviewed include young migrants from rural areas who had lost touch with their communities and had not been home for an average of 5 to 10 years.

Despite their long separation from home, in-depth ethnographic interviews with almajirai reveal a very human picture of young men with dreams, heroes, role models, hopes, fears and a strong desire for self-improvement through Islamic and modern education. Other key findings include:

- Asked if they would like to have modern education (boko), 52% of the 68 valid answers said yes, 10% said no, and 38% said they are currently attending one, or had once attended a modern (boko) school. Most of those who once attended boko school reported that they would like to return to school. The positive attitudes toward boko among the almajirai indicate clear divergence from a core component in JAS ideology.

- When questioned about their views on public authority (government), about 68% of the valid responses said they see and experience government positively, 15% said they do so negatively, and 17% said they are indifferent to government. However, when asked if they will want government to help them, 98.6% said yes. On the type of help they want from government, 38% of the valid answers said they want provision of basic social amenities, while 24% said they want the construction of classes and modernization of their school structure. Another 9% wanted salary for their teachers.

- Still on the issue of leadership, when asked who their role models are, 31% cited their teachers and parents as role models, and 23% cited traditional Islamic scholars (such as Sheikhs Dahiru Bauchi and Ibrahim Nyass). Another 28% cited politicians and public figures such as Governor Sule Lamido of Jigawa State, Governor Abdulfaliz Yari of Zamfara State, Governor Rabiu Kwankwaso of Kano State, and Mallam Sanusi Lamido Sunusi, former Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria and now Emir of Kano. About 12% cited the Prophet Muhammad, 3% cited non-traditional scholars while the final 3% said they had no role models.

- Interviews with Islamic scholars and opinion leaders reveal their common view that there is nothing in the almajiri system of Qur’anic education that is inherently radicalizing. One interviewee stated that almajirai will not participate in violence because they know hell-fire is the punishment for shedding blood of the innocent. One informant sums up the common view among the teachers of almajirai: “Almajiri doesn’t know anything other than seeking Islamic Knowledge and being respectful so that he can achieve his aim.”

While the diversity in the almajirai’s attitudes and opinions is quite interesting, the more salient point is the clear disagreement with the core components of JAS ideology. Many almajirai hold positive attitudes toward boko, accept and admire non-religious public authorities, the very things that JAS holds to be religiously forbidden.

Clearly, the almajirai are not simply a homogeneous group of youngsters waiting for automatic radicalisation. Their attitudes and hopes are hardly those of a ready-made army of foot soldiers for the JAS insurgency. The harsh and debilitating conditions of their existence have undoubtedly made the almajirai more vulnerable to radicalisation. But in light of
the complexities of the causes and pathways to radicalisation, that vulnerability alone is neither automatic nor sufficient reason for radicalisation.

**Women’s Participation in Radicalisation**

Available literature has lamented women’s victimization and celebrated their struggle for empowerment but has shied away from the other side of the coin: women who participate in radical movements, seeking empowerment by different means. How do women participate in Islamist radical movements in Northern Nigeria?

Primary data for this study was obtained from qualitative interviews, group discussions and participant observation across four states (Kano, Kaduna, Borno, and Plateau) as well as FCT-Abuja. Data was also obtained from transcription of videos released by JAS, and media reports on women who escaped from JAS camps. Respondents included men and women who represent a wide range of experiences.

Echoing the importance of family ties as a pathway into radicalisation, this case-study discovers that the most common pathway of women’s entry into JAS is through marriage—either marrying men who become radicalised afterwards, remarrying known JAS members upon the death of their husbands, willingly marrying men who are known JAS members, or being abducted and forced into ‘marriage’ with members. Other key findings are:

- **The women’s radicalisation is directly connected to the wider context of gender roles in Nigeria.** A societal and cultural expectation of women to be dependent on men for their livelihood compelled women to become part of JAS once their husbands are active members of JAS.

- **Some women choose to be active participants in JAS, ideologically convinced and operationally involved in several roles.** Apart from domestic chores and providing companionship to their husbands, women serve as *logisticians* who carry money and weapons to various JAS cells. As *recruiters*, they seek out new members typically by exploiting family ties or other personal relationships. Increasingly, women have also assumed the role of *suicide bombers*, *fighters* and *operational leaders* who carry weapons during combat. But these are still fewer than men.

  - Many women do not join JAS because of ideological motivation but are forced by circumstances and/or family members. Abduction is a common pathway of coercing women into JAS. Coercing women into the group is driven by the imperative of having women in a supportive capacity to the men, who are usually husbands who rely on women for utilitarian purposes. Unlike the active participants, coerced women undertake these roles under duress, without necessarily becoming radicalised.

  - **Muslims in Northern Nigeria hold deep distrust and widespread fear of Western military domination and cultural imperialism,** particularly from the United States. Since women are regarded as custodians of morality and values, extremist groups such as JAS claim to ‘shield’ Muslim women from these external and ‘corrupting’ cultural influences.

  - Women are held captive within a bigger identity crisis in Northern Nigeria where individuality, especially that of women, clashes with interpretations of Islamic injunctions that seek to impose collective uniformity. But given the diversity of Islamic groups (*Sunni, Shia, Sufi* etc.), gender roles
are based on a group’s doctrines that often confine women to economic dependency on men.

Clearly, conceptions of unequal gender roles that subordinate women to male authority add significant dimensions to the complexities of radicalisation, without totally eliminating women’s agency. Wives of senior JAS commanders play a leadership role over other women, reflecting the larger society’s gender norms that expect women not to act or exist as individuals, but as supporters of their spouses.

LESSONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The complex processes and causes of radicalisation should be constantly kept in view while adopting triage approach to formulate appropriately targeted policies and strategies of intervention.

First, violent radicals should be decisively contained, but without violating human rights of individuals or the rules of engagement. Second, non-violent radicals should be approached through careful understanding of, and effective response to, the preconditions and permissive factors, as well as their ideological convictions and pathways of radicalisation. Finally, the vast majority of non-radicals should be mobilised through public enlightenment to resist radicalisation and to act as counter-radical force.

To effectively contain violent radicals, the institutions and agencies responsible for maintaining internal law and order should increase their capacity through specialised training for effective monitoring and early detection of radicalisation that poses security threat. More women should be included in the rank and file of security forces. Before deployment to contain violent groups, troops should be acquainted with the cultural nuances and community concerns in ways that will enhance operational effectiveness and reduce potential misunderstanding between troops and local communities.

Deployed troops should be required to strictly adhere to the rules of engagement, respect human rights of individuals, and avoid collective punishment of communities in which violent radicals are embedded. Officers and their troops should realise that lawful conduct in combat is not only the right thing to do morally, but it is also the reliable way of ensuring community support. Impunity is not simply hazardous morally; it is also counter-productive operationally. The incidents of human rights violations by security forces, if unchecked, could serve as trigger for revenge by aggrieved parties. Zero tolerance for lawless conduct should be considered an indispensable component of the strategy of combating violent radicalisation.

Dealing with non-violent radicals should focus on preventing radicalised groups and individuals from slipping into violence by expeditiously addressing their grievances, and also countering their radical ideas and beliefs. The different pathways and group dynamics that lead to radicalisation suggest the imperative for close monitoring of individuals, groups and movements that have exhibited radical tendencies.

The preconditions and permissive factors leading to radicalisation are better addressed within the broad framework of government’s development programmes, which should be calibrated to meet the needs of areas and communities that are experiencing radicalisation. Policies addressing the economic challenges that contribute to radicalisation should emphasize sector-specific and labour intensive economic activities that can generate jobs with a high youth and female components.

Encouraging people to take a greater stake in the political system can reduce the potential of unaddressed political grievances that could...
be become the preconditions and permissive factors of radicalisation. Governance deficits and lack of political participation can lead to the perception that there are no alternatives to violent retaliation—a major pathway to radicalisation. More representative and accountable local governance is needed for effective service delivery and strengthening popular confidence in the capacity of the political system to respond effectively to the needs of citizens.

Sensitising the vast majority of non-radicals to resist radicalisation and to energizing them to become counter-radical forces, Government should encourage community leaders, especially prominent religious figures, to develop strong counter-radical narratives and use mass media to disseminate them widely. These counter-narratives must:

- include the diverse religious perspectives and voices
- present moderate religious views, stress the importance of inter-faith harmony within the context of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Nigeria
- discourage gender-based discrimination and oppression
- highlight the far-reaching consequences of violence on individuals and communities

Providing infrastructure in the rural areas is critical. Network of feeder-roads should be constructed for effective transportation, marketing and distribution of rural products. Logistical support should include reliable supply of electricity, access to appropriate information and communication technologies, banking and innovative financial services. This is another area for the government to attract the support from international agencies and development partners.

In addition to creating jobs, life in the countryside should be made entertaining by encouraging local sport and athletic activities, and formation of video clubs for showing documentaries, training films, public enlightenment, social and economic benefits of women’s empowerment, the costs of violence and the benefits of peace, and success stories from rural areas. Other steps can promote clubs and associations that might serve as local fora for discussions and debates, thereby generating an intellectual excitement in which the countryside’s young could participate.

The increased vulnerability of almajirai to radicalisation is better addressed through mainstreaming their educational needs into national policymaking on universal basic education, child protection from trafficking, and the rights of children to education and dignity. Almajirai should be seen as a category of displaced children and youth rather than as a religious category of potential zealots.
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